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R. v. OAKES 1986-1997
BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD©
BY LEON E. TRAKMAN,* WILLIAM COLE-HAMILTON,**
AND SEAN GATIEN***
The Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Oakes,
identified two standards of justification in applying
section 1. The first standard was normative. The
second was methodological, called the Oakes test. The
Court, until recently, applied the Oakes test mech-
anically and avoided the normative standard. More
recently, in Egan v. Canada and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v.
Canada (A.G.), it resorted to a normative analysis that
is indeterminate and unpredictable. This article
challenges both the mechanical application of the
Oakes test and the Court's new normative approach. It
proposes, and illustrates, a preferable alternative that is
both determinate and predictable. It is supported by
appendices that analyze section 1 cases between 1986
and 1997.
La Cour supr8me du Canada, dans R c. Oakes, a
identifd deuxmesures dejustification pourl'application
de 'article premier. La premiere est normative, tandis
que ]a seconde est m6thodologique, 6galement
surnomme6 le test de l'arrit Oakes. Jusqu'A
r6cemment, la Cour a appliqu6 le test de l'arr~t Oakes
m6caniquement et a 6vit6 la mesure normative. Plus
r6cemment, dans les arrats Egan c. Canada et RJR-
MacDonald Inc. c. Canada (P.G.), elle a eu recours A
une analyse normative, laquelle se r6v~le 8tre
ind6termin6e et imprdvisible. Cet article compare les
deux m6thodes d'analyse, soit 'analyse m6canique du
test de I'arr~t Oakes ainsi que la nouvelle approche
normative de ]a Cour. II propose, et illustre, une
alternative pr6f6rable qui est determinable et
prdvisible. Celle-ci est soutenue par des annexes qui
analysent les d6cisions rendues sous 'article premier
entre 1986 et 1997.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he judiciary must consider ... the nature of Canadian society and how this should affect
Charter rulings. ... In determining whether infringement of rights is "reasonable" and
1998] R. v. Oakes 1986-1997 85
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" under section 1, what is
"reasonable" in the Canadian context? What is "demonstrably justified"? More starkly,
what meaning is to be assigned to the phrase "free and democratic society"? If Canadian
judges are to properly deal with these questions, they must take steps which were not
essential to judicial decision making in the pre-Charter era. They must steep themselves
in the debates on the questions in academic journals. They must reflect and cogitate, to
the end of developing a consistent and appropriate philosophical base for their decisions.
In short, decision making under the Charter must become a more profound, intellectual
and academic endeavour than it has heretofore been in this country.1
More than a decade has passed since Dickson C.J.'s majority
decision in R. v. Oakes.2 The Chief Justice's decision in Oakes has
"taken on some of the character of holy writ" and has become
synonymous with section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.3 Dickson C.J.'s decision set out the well-known Oakes test
which evolved into the sole method by which the Supreme Court
determined the "reasonable limits" of all Charter rights and freedoms. It
must be remembered, however, that Dickson C.J. never intended the
four-part Oakes test to be the unique test of section 1 validity. He also
devised a normative standard of justification that was to serve as the
backdrop against which the four-fold Oakes test was to be applied.
Dickson C.J. named this the ultimate standard of justification, which he
articulated as follows:
The underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, and the ultimate standard against
which a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable
and demonstrably justifiable.4
This ultimate standard was grounded in Dickson C.J.'s assertion
that judicial reasoning under section 1 should be framed in light of the
I The Hon. B. McLachlin, "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Judicial Perspective"
(1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 579 at 588.
2 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. Section 1 is the second phase of
judicial review mandated by the structure of the Charter. Charter review is conducted in two phases:
(i) assessing whether a law or government action has violated a Charter guarantee, and (ii) whether
this limit is reasonably and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Peter Hogg
refers to this test as "holy writ": see P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1997) c. 35 at 16. For a detailed analysis of the four-part Oakes test, see S.R. Peck, "An
Analytical Framework for the Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987)
25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. On the limitations of this four-part test in the first decade following Oakes,
see Part II, below. For further information on the application of the Oakes test by the Supreme
Court of Canada, see Appendices A and B, below. Readers interested in further information
relating to the Appendices should contact the authors directly.
4 Supra note 2 at 136.
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underlying values of a free and democratic society. He recognized that a
limit on a constitutional right would be justified only if it were grounded
in values that were both normative and fundamental in character.5
An analysis of section 1 decisions of the Supreme Court between
1986 and 1995 demonstrates that the Court consistently avoided
engaging in the normative analysis proposed by Dickson C.J. in Oakes.
The Court instead based its determinations on the four-fold Oakes test
that is methodological in design and technical in application. The result
is that the normative values underlying Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard
were either ignored in applying the Oakes test or were simply not
articulated. Contrary to Dickson C.J.'s original design, these decisions
did not use section I as an interpretative vehicle for reconciling the
disparate values of Canada's free and democratic society as they
conflicted in specific cases. Instead, they carved out an analysis that was
mechanical in application and indiscriminate in applying to all section 1
cases. In effect, the Oakes test became the methodological tail that
wagged the normative dog.6
5 The term "normative" is used throughout this article in its general sense. It denotes the
attributes of judicial decisionmaking as they pertain to fundamental values and principles (norms).
These attributes are distinguishable from the factual and technical aspects of legal decisionmaking.
Normative attributes inhere in the analysis of s. 1 in these ways. First, the judiciary has a mandate
under s. 1 to ground its decisions in the fundamental values of a free and democratic Canadian
society. Second, the values underlying s. 1 ground both Charter rights and limitations placed on
those rights. Third, the values and principles underlying s. 1 are engaged by the social, political, and
cultural context that arises in each case. In summary, normative values justify decisions under s. 1.
The analysis of those values is also necessary in applying s. 1 to specific cases.
6 See Part II, below. For a statistical analysis of Supreme Court decisions on s. 1 of the
Charter, see Appendices A and B below. For a useful preliminary analysis of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to engage in normative analysis under s. 1 of the Charter, see P.A. Chapman, "The
Politics of Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J.
867 at 873. Chapman notes that, at that time, "[mlost of the articles written on section 1 have taken
a rather mechanical view of its operation .... " Her conception of a court system that is unwilling to
engage in normative analysis is markedly in contrast with the optimistic vision advanced a few years
earlier. On such Charter optimism, see L.D. Barry, "Law, Policy and Statutory Interpretation under
a Constitutionally Entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1982) 60 Can. Bar Rev.
237. But see R.A. Macdonald, "Postscript and Prelude-The Jurisprudence of the Charter: Eight
Theses" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 321 at 337. Barry, at 264, argues that, with the advent of the
Charter, judges "will be forced to admit they must make choices between competing values. They
will no longer be able to portray themselves as mere mechanical finders and appliers of the law."
Sidney Peck argues further, that
[i]n their approach to section 1, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada developed
doctrine which on its face suggests that they intended to embrace judicial activism in
order to protect the Charter rights and freedoms, that they intended to encourage lower
court judges to adopt a similar position, and that they intended to insist on a high
standard of justification in order to make it difficult for government to salvage a limit by
bringing it within section 1.
Supra note 3 at 78. For the view, in 1983, that the courts are likely to avoid an activist role in
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The Supreme Court appears to have recognized the need for a
normative standard in recent years. Since 1995, the decisions of that
Court have attempted to graft a normative superstructure onto the
Oakes test, with varying degrees of success. This shift in direction is
evident in decisions by the late Mr. Justice Sopinka in Egan v. Canada,7
and more notably, in the approaches adopted by La Forest J. and
McLachlin J. in RIR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)8 and by La Forest
J. in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15.9 These decisions have
some comparable characteristics. We refer to this shift in approach to
section 1 as the "Oakes-Plus" approach. This latest approach attempts
to revive the ultimate standard of justification enunciated by Dickson
C.J. in Oakes. It also recognizes, in varying respects, that section 1
decisionmaking must be framed in light of fundamental values protected
interpreting and applying the Charter, see B. Hovius & R. Martin, "The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 354 at 355. See also T.J.
Christian, "The Limitation of Liberty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1982) Spec. Ed. U.B.C. L. Rev. 105; W.E. Conklin, "Interpreting and App!ying the
Limitations Clause: An Analysis of Section 1" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 75; and P.A. Bender,
"Justifications for Limiting Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights and Freedoms: Some Remarks
About the Proper Role of Section One of the Canadian Charter" (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 669.
7 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter Egan]. For a critical analysis of Sopinka J.'s problematic
decision see Part III(A), below. For comments on Egan, see B.A. Schnurr, "Claims by Common
Law Spouses-and Same Sex Partners Against Estates" (1996) Spec. Lect. L.S.U.C. 35; H. Lessard et
al., "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95 Term" (1996) 7 Supreme Court L.R. (2d)
81; M. Bailey, "Developments in Family Law: The 1994-95 Term" (1996) 7 Supreme Court L.R.
(2d) 327; R. Wintemute, "Discrimination Against Same Sex Couples: Sections 15(1) and I of the
Charter: Egan v. Canada" (1995) 73 Can. Bar Rev. 682; J. Keene, "Discrimination in the Provision
of Government Services and S. 15 of the Charter. Making the Best of the Judgments in Egan,
Thibaudeau, and Miron" (1995) 11 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 107; and C.F. Stychin, "Novel Concepts: A
Comment on Egan and Nesbit v. The Queen" (1995) 6 Const. F. 101.
8 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter RJR-MacDonald]. In RJR-MacDonald, both the majority
and minority moved towards a less formalist, more flexible construction of s. I in balancing
individual and community ends. For comments on RJR-MacDonald, see M. Jackman, "The
Constitutional Basis for Federal Regulation of Health" (1996) 5:2 Health L. Rev. 3; N. Campbell,
"The Interlocutory Injunction in Canada: Reading Smoke Signals" (1995) Spec. Lect. L.S.U.C. 211;
R. Moon, "RJR-MacDonald v. Canada on the Freedom to Advertise" (1995) 7 Const. Forum 1; A.C.
Hutchinson & D. Schneiderman, "Smoking Guns: The Federal Government Confronts the Tobacco
and Gun Lobbies" (1995) 7 Const. Forum 16; R.A. Shiner, "The Silent Majority Speaks: RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada" (1995) 7 Const. Forum 8; and E. McNaughton & J. Galway, "RJR-
MacDonald, Tobacco Ad Restrictions Up In Smoke" (1995) 5 Can. Corp. Counsel 35. For an
illustration of a case in which the Supreme Court took a guarded normative approach under s. 7 of
the Charter, see R. v.Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 137-39 [hereinafter Morgentaler]. But see
Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 448.
9 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [hereinafter Ross]. It is pertinent that, with the exception of Harvey v.
New Brunswick (A.G.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876 [hereinafter Harvey], all the s. 1 cases following the RJR-
MacDonald line of cases deal with freedom of expression. On these cases, see Part III(C), below. It
is also relevant that, in Harvey, the Supreme Court also adopted a normative and contextual
approach towards s. 1. See also text accompanying notes 136-40, infra.
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by the Charter. But, to varying degrees, the Oakes-Plus decisions share
comparable weaknesses: none manages to integrate normative analysis
into their opinions in a consistent and coherent fashion. The harsh
reality is that the Court has swung the decisional pendulum from an
overly technical to an unpredictable normative analysis of section 1. The
result has been a disjointed analysis of section 1 that appears to lack a
clear and principled foundation.
This article examines section 1 decisionmaking from 1986-1997.
It concludes that neither the Supreme Court's decisions in the first
decade following Oakes, nor its more recent Oakes-Plus decisions satisfy
the spirit of Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard and four-fold test set out in
Oakes. The cases in the decade since Oakes suffer from the opposite
defect to the cases since 1995. In the first decade following Oakes, the
Court placed undue reliance upon the four-fold Oakes test. Since 1995,
its Oakes-Plus approach has introduced an unbridled normative analysis
under section 1.10
This article argues that, in distinction to both approaches, a
preferable response is to resort to and consolidate both a normative and
a methodological analysis under section 1. We endorse the spirit of
10 We acknowledge that judges on the Supreme Court have displayed markedly different
degrees of judicial activism in deciding Charter cases, particularly in its first decade. However, the
extent to which judges engaged in normative analysis, in relation to s. 1 in particular, is far more
limited. For an early account of this restrained activism under the Charter, see P. Russell, "The
First Three Years in Charterland" (1985) 28 Can. Pub. Admin. 367. On the proposition that the
framers of the Charter intended to accord the Courts expanded normative power, see A.F. Bayefsky,
"The Judicial Function Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 32 McGill
L.J. 791. Bayefsky states that, according to the legislative history, ss. I and 52 were to give the
judiciary "a mandate to review the substance of legislation for its conformity to human rights
standards and to render legislation inconsistent with those standards of no force or effect ...": ibid.
at 819. We maintain, in this article, notwithstanding this legislative authority vested in the courts,
that the Supreme Court avoided engaging in normative inquiry under s. I during the first decade
following Oakes: see Part II, below. But see P.W. Hogg & R. Penner, "The Contribution of Chief
Justice Dickson to an Interpretative Framework and Value System for Section 1 Of The Charter of
Rights" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 428. Hogg and Penner contend, at 434, that the values of the ultimate
standard enunciated in Oakes do infuse the Oakes test. For an excellent study on normative
differences among judges on the Supreme Court, see F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey,
"The Supreme Court's First One Hundred Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis"
(1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. See generally, J.C. Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and
Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); P. C. Weiler, "The Charter at Work:
Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of Labour and Employment Law" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 117;
and R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992). On the
balancing of interests under the Charter, see for example, M. Gold, "The Rhetoric of Rights: The
Supreme Court and the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 375 at 391 ("C. Limiting the
Appearance of Balancing Interests"); and The Hon. G.V. La Forest, "The Balancing of Interests
under the Charter" (1992) 2 N.J.C.L. 133. On the general reluctance of the Court to engage in
normative decisionmaking during the first ten years of the Charter, see supra note 6.
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Dickson C.J.'s normative standard in Oakes but argue that the Oakes
methodology is not integrated with, and fails to satisfy, this normative
standard. The goal of this article is to integrate normative and
methodological analysis under section 1 in a manner that is consistent
and contextual.11 This requires that section 1 be applied consistently, on
the basis of an examination of the values at stake and in light of the
11 In proposing a normative and a principled method of analyzing s. 1, we dispute the frequent
assumption that normative and principled decisionmaking are in conflict. Determining whether a
particular political expression falls within the founding liberal right to free expression requires an
evaluation of the normative value that the decisionmaker attributes to the political interests in
issue. The fact that such a determination is normative, however, does not deny the need for the
decisionmaker to justify those normative choices in a principled manner. See, for example, L.E.
Trakman, "Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities" (1995) 56 Ohio State L.J. 899
at 902-11 [hereinafter "Transforming Free Speech"]. Those who argue for a principled approach
towards judicial decisionmaking, to the exclusion of normative choice, fail to acknowledge the
extent to which principles are grounded in normative values. Those who would reject principled
decisionmaking for dressing up preconceived norms in principled garb, fail to reckon with the extent
to which principles make it more difficult for decisionmakers to hide their own normative
preferences. For proponents of principled decisionmaking, see J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 74; and R.M. Dworkin,
"The Forum of Principle" (1981) 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469. Dworkin argues that "the Court should
make decisions of principle rather than policy-decisions about what rights people have under our
constitutional system rather than decisions about how the general welfare is best promoted": ibid. at
516. See also R.M. Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996) 1-38. In contrast, critical legal scholars like
Peter Gabel argue that such principled decisionmaking is inherently subjective and therefore, not
principled at all: see P. Gabel, Book Review (1977) 91 Harv. L. Rev. 302,305-06; and P. Brest, "The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale LJ. 1063. Compare L.G. Sager, "Rights Skepticism and Process-Based
Responses" (1981) 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 417. For proponents of "normatively neutral" methods
decisionmaking, see, for example, R.H. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems" (1971) 47 Ind. L.J. 1. But compare H. Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law" (1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1. For criticisms of both principled and "normatively
neutral" methods of Charter-decisionmaking, see, for example, P.J. Monahan & M. Finkelstein,
"The Charter of Rights and Public Policy in Canada" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 501; J.C. Bakan,
"Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor
What You Need)" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 307; J. Fudge & H.J. Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights:
A Politics With Little Class" (1992) 1 Soc. & Legal Stud. 45; H.J. Glasbeek, "From Constitutional
Rights to 'Real' Rights--'R-i-i-g-hts Fo-or-wa-ard Ho'!" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 468;
A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45 Advocate 857; C.P.
Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter. Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992); A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and
Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); and S.L. Martin & K.E. Mahoney, eds.,
Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987). On the view that Charter rights fail to
deliver substantive guarantees and serve the interests of self-interested political groups, see J.C.
Bakan, "What's Right with Social Rights," in J.C. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice
and the Constitution: Perspectives on a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1992) 85; and J.C. Bakan, "Strange Expectations: A Review of Two Theories of Judicial Review"
(1990) 35 McGill L.J. 439. On a method of reconciling normative and principled methods of
decisionmaking, see L.E. Trakman & S. Gatien, Rights and Responsibilities (forthcoming).
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context of each case.] 2  The purpose is to facilitate section 1
decisionmaking that is normatively justified, comprehensible, and leads
to predictable results.13
This article commences with an examination of the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada during the decade following Oakes. This
is followed by an evaluation of cases since 1995 that exhibit the Oakes-
Plus approach. The article then argues for a new approach towards
section 1 analysis that redresses weaknesses in the existing analysis and
arrives at a constructive alternative. This is the subject of a detailed
illustration of this new analysis, grounded in the facts of RJR-
MacDonald. The article concludes by proposing the adoption of such an
analysis by the courts. Two appendices analyze the application of the
Oakes test by the Supreme Court since 1986.
II. DECISIONMAKING UNDERR. v. OAKES
The Supreme Court of Canada's reluctance to set out a section 1
test prior to Oakes, handed down in 1986, is understandable. It clearly
was a difficult task to devise, from scratch, an analysis of section 1 that
could capture its various complexities in a normative and functional
judicial analysis. Section I of the Charter states that:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
12 The Supreme Court of Canada, to some degree, has already resorted to a contextual
approach. See, for example, McLachlin J. in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter Rocket], cited with approval by La Forest J. in RJR-MacDonald,
supra note 8 at 280. On this contextual approach, in the cases following the RJR-MacDonald line of
reasoning, see Part III(A) and (C), below.
13 By "predictable" we do not mean that a single result will be self-evident. Judges may well
reach different determinations in the same context because they conceive of different normative
values, or attach different weights to the same values. However, we do claim that, in adopting a
normative and principled s. 1 analysis, judicial decisions will have a greater capacity to be
predictable because they will encompass the normative assumptions of the court. This is especially
likely when judges adopt preferred normative positions and apply them in a principled manner in
each context. In these respects we agree with, yet diverge from, those who insist that "until we find
a way to make our judges answerable for their views, ... [Charter values] will be vulnerable to
personal politics on the Bench": D.M. Beatty, "The Canadian Conception of Equality" (1996) 46
U.T.L.J. 349 at 374. It is unavoidable that the personal views of judges will influence their
conception of the values underlying a free and democratic society and their manner of construing
those values. But the goal is to subject such personal values to more open scrutiny, not to negate
their existence. In proposing a principled, contextual, and integrated analysis of s. 1, this article
aims at facilitating that scrutiny: see Part IV, below. See also supra note 11.
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As Dickson C.J. noted in Oakes, section 1 plays a unique role
within the Charter. It both "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in the Charte?' and sets "reasonable limits" on infractions upon those
rights and freedoms. The Chief Justice noted that the first function of
section I is to guarantee rights and freedoms. Its second function is to
limit them:
Accordingly, any s. 1 inquiry must be premised on an understanding that the impugned
limit violates constitutional rights and freedoms-rights and freedoms which are part of
the supreme law of Canada. As Wilson J. stated in Singh v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, ... "it is important to remember that the courts are conducting this inquiry in
light of a commitment to uphold the rights and freedoms set out in the other sections of
the Charter."
14
Section 1 has a uniquely broad scope of application because it
both safeguards and limits every right and freedom in the Charter.
Unlike any other section of the Charter, under section 1 the courts are
required to evaluate a range of individual rights and freedoms, many of
which are subject to competing values and interests within a
constitutional democracy. As a result, section 1 has been applied to
determine, inter alia, the validity of laws that impact on abortion,S
mandatory retirement,16 Sunday closing,17 same-sex spousal pension
benefits,18 prostitution,19 hate literature,2 0 and assisted suicide.21 In
each instance, section 1 obliges the judiciary to exercise complex social
choices, to weigh disparate communal values in an often divided society,
and to evaluate different conceptions of rights and freedoms within it.22
1 4 Oakes, supra note 2 at 135-36, Dickson C.J.
15 Motgentaler, supra note 8.
16 McKinneyv. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter McKinney].
1 7 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M]; and R. v. Edwards Books
andArt Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [hereinafter Edwards Books].
18 Egan, supra note 7.
19Reference Re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123
[hereinafter Prostitution Reference].
20 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra]; and R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R.
731 [hereinafter Zundel].
21 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
22 As Patrick Monahan explained: "In order to give content to the [the Charter], the courts will
have to devise some normative theory about the nature of freedom and democracy": P.J. Monahan,
"Judicial Review and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review" (1987) 21 U.B.C. L. Rev. 87 at 97.
See also A. Petter & A.C. Hutchinson, "Rights in Conflict: The Dilemma of Charter Legitimacy"
(1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 531; and P.J. Monahan & A. Petter, "Developments in Constitutional
Law: The 1985-86 Term" (1987) 9 Supreme Court L.R. 69 at 103.
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No other section of the Charter engages such a broad palette of
normative choices. 23 Nor does any other section require that such norms
be weighed against one other.2 4 Consequently, the then Chief Justice
undertook a daunting task in Oakes: he devised an analysis that,
henceforth, would be used by Canadian judges to transform each and
every Charter right from an abstract entitlement to a concrete
guarantee.25 In Oakes, Dickson C.J. set out two distinct but related
standards of justification under section 1. He located the first standard
of justification, referred to as the ultimate standard, within the values
and principles of a free and democratic society, stating:
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society ... . The underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are the
genesis of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, and the ultimate standard
against which a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be
reasonable and demonstrably justified.
2 6
23 In setting limits on Charter rights under s. 1 in the absence of a principled method of
analysis, there is a real risk of ad hoc decisionmaking by courts. Sidney Peck, for example, observes:
When judges balance under section 1, they are doing ... ad hoc balancing. They do not
state a general rule of law, but rather decide whether the particular limit contained in the
particular enactment under review is reasonable and demonstrably justified in the
particular circumstances of the case.... The decision based on section 1 balancing is ad
hoc in the sense that it is unique to the particular limit in the particular circumstances
considered by the justices. It does not lay down a general rule of law about the degree of
protection afforded ... nor even, perhaps, about the validity in general of rules ....
See Peck, supra note 3 at 27-28 [footnotes omitted].
24 For some, the open-endedness of s. 1 is also a pitfall. Peter Hogg and Roland Penner, for
example, address the risk that a non-elected judiciary will employ s. 1 to "[re-do] the political
calculus of costs and benefits that has already been performed by an elected legislative body": Hogg
& Penner, supra note 10 at 429. They argue, further, that the courts often lack the "expertise and
resources to review the legislature's judgement that a particular law will increase the general
welfare."
25 In the case of s. 2(b), for example, virtually every restriction on speech has been found to be
a violation by the Court. Thus, it is left to s. 1 to determine the final result of each freedom of
expression case. The result is that the scope of freedom of expression owes far more to s. 1
jurisprudence than to s. 2(b). See also Hogg, supra note 3 c. 40 at 9.
26 Oakes, supra note 2 at 136. These values and principles, enunciated by Dickson C.J. in
Oakes, are comparable to the "larger objects of the Charter" set out by Dickson C.J. in Big M, supra
note 17 at 344:
In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom in
question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter
itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical
origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of
the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the
Charter. The interpretation should be, as the judgment in Southam emphasizes, a
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and
securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charters protection. At the same time it is
important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question, but to
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Dickson C.J. insisted further that these normative values
determine both the nature of rights and the "reasonable limits" to
impose upon them.27 In this way, he recognized the integral relationship
between normative and principled decisionmaking under section 1:
"[The i]nclusion of these words ["free and democratic society"] as the
final standard of justification for limits on rights and freedoms refers the
Court to the very purpose for which the Charter was originally
entrenched in the Constitution: Canadian society is to be free and
democratic."2s
Dickson C.J.'s conception of a free and democratic society was
principled, but not wholly abstract. 29 He provided, as important
illustrations, "but a few" of the values and principles of a free and
democratic society that courts ought to consider when applying section
1: "respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs,
respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in
society."3 0
Dickson C.J. devised a second standard of justification under
section 1. This was the four-fold test, or Oakes test, which courts were to
apply in reaching logical and comprehensive determinations under
section 1. He intended this specific standard of justification to balance
the pre-existing tension between freedoms guaranteed by the Charter
and limits imposed on them by governmental action in light of
fundamental values that ground both. The test had a functional aim: to
give form to the ultimate standard of justification, to constrain its open-
endedness, and to set out criteria to guide decisionmakers in applying
the test to specific cases.
Dickson C.J.'s formulation of section 1, therefore, sought to
integrate a normative analysis of the fundamental values underlying
recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must therefore, as this Court's
decision in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker... illustrates, be placed in its proper
linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts.
For an analysis of this statement in Big M, see Peck, supra note 3 at 8-21.
27 Dickson C.J. evaluated the words "unreasonable search and seizure" in Hunter v. Southam
Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155, concluding that "[it is clear that the meaning of 'unreasonable'
cannot be determined by recourse to a dictionary, nor for that matter, by reference to the rules of
statutory construction." See also Hogg & Penner, supra note 10 at 429.
2 8 Oakes, supra note 2 at 136.
29 Ibid. at 227. Dickson C.J. referred to his earlier decision in Big M, supra note 17 at 352,
where he stated: "Principles will have to be developed for recognizing which government objectives
are of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom."
30 Oakes, supra note 2 at 136.
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Canada's free and democratic society with a consistent and predictable
method of balancing those fundamental values.3 1 This required that a
balance be established between the normative touchstone of Dickson
C.J.'s section 1 analysis, set out in the ultimate standard of justification,
and the principled restraints upon that ultimate standard embodied in
the four-fold Oakes test. While this ultimate standard was intended to
evaluate the substance of the legislation being challenged under section
1 of the Charter, the four-part Oakes test was to ensure that courts
avoided unbridled and unpredictable decisionmaking in applying that
normative touchstone in specific cases.
The Oakes test has two major components. The first component
scrutinizes whether the objective of the law in question is important
enough to warrant overriding a Charter guarantee. The second
component examines the means chosen to satisfy that objective and
further, whether that means is reasonable and demonstrably justified.
This second component is structured around a "proportionality test"
that requires scrutiny of the governmental objective and the legislative
means of achieving it.
The sections immediately below analyze the Oakes test with
three goals in mind. First, it identifies the four sub-tests within Oakes.
Second, it evaluates them in relationship to Dickson C.J.'s ultimate
standard of justification. Third, it demonstrates the insufficiency of that
relationship in practice.
A. Sufficiently Important Objective Test
To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First the objective, which the measures
responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be 'of
sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom'
.... 32
The first branch of the Oakes test requires that the government
establish the importance of the objective underlying the impugned
31 Compare A. Lokan, "The Rise and Fall of Doctrine Under Section 1 of the Charter" (1992)
24 Ottawa L. Rev. 163 at 177:
The major problem with the Oakes test, as set out in its "logically pure" form, is that it
simply purports to announce a standard of judicial review, without reference to any of the
factors that may go to how strict that standard should be. The purported standard exists
in a vacuum. When it comes to be applied and given definition, it gives no guidance as to
when the Charter must give way to competing values.
32 Oakes, supra note 2 at 138 [emphasis added].
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legislative provision. In Oakes, the Court stated that a valid objective
must accord with the values of a free and democratic society and further,
that these objectives must "relate to concerns which are pressing and
substantial ... ."33 A valid governmental objective, it concluded, must
also further "the realization of collective goals of fundamental
importance."3 4 Finally, the governmental objective must be intra vires
the power of the legislature.35 The "pressing and substantial" sub-test
within the Oakes framework is intended to establish the nature of the
government's objective and whether that objective is sufficiently
important to justify the impugned violation of a Charter right or
freedom. It is apparent that this sub-test can only be discharged by
evaluating the values underlying the impugned measures and the right or
freedom infringed. 36 This renders the "sufficiently important objective"
test into an important component of Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard.
In the ten years since the Oakes test was adopted, the
"sufficiently importance objective" test has played a limited role in the
application of the Oakes test. The majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada found that the government's objective was sufficiently important
in 97 per cent of the instances in which Charter violations were
considered under section 1.37 Professor Hogg observed that "the
requirement of a sufficiently important objective has been satisfied in all
but one or two of the Charter cases that have reached the Supreme
Court of Canada."38
The following are objectives which the Court found were
sufficiently important to justify the violation of Charter rights and
freedoms: "seek[ing] to eradicate the various forms of social nuisance
arising from the public display of the sale of sex;" 3 9 "maintenance of a
33 Ibid.
3 4 Ibid. at 136.
3 5 Hogg, supra note 3 c. 35 at 22-23.
3 6 Supra notes 10-12.
37 See Appendix A, Table 1, below. From 1986 to the time of writing (autumn, 1997), a
majority of the Supreme Court considered eighty-seven violations under s. 1, eighty-four of which
were held to have pressing and substantial objectives.
38 Supra note 3 c. 35 at 20. In Zundel supra note 20, four justices out of seven failed the
objective of a law infringing s. 2(b). In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
143 [hereinafter Andrews], the Court was divided, with three out of six justices failing the objective
of a law infringing s. 15. See also Appendix B, Table 3, below.
3 9 Prostitution Reference, supra note 19 at 1225.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
high standard of professionalism" among dentists;40 "alleviation of
poverty of elderly [heterosexual] spouses."41 and precluding advertisers
"from taking advantage of children both by inciting them to make
purchases and by inciting them to have their parents make purchases." 42
In applying the "sufficiently important objective" test, the
Supreme Court has varied the degree of precision with which the
objectives of impugned legislation have been characterized. Its
approach has led to varying characterizations of governmental
objectives, without reasons being given for the degree of precision
accorded in specific cases. This approach appears to be manipulative.
For example, more general objectives typically appear more pressing and
substantial than more specific ones. Hogg illustrates this by referring to
the Supreme Court's decision in Andrews.43 The minority in that
decision characterized the objective of the law more generally, as
restricting entry to the legal profession to those qualified to practice law.
The majority characterized the objective more specifically, as restricting
entry to the legal profession to Canadian citizens. As a result, the
majority could not justify the citizenship requirement in order to strike
down the legislative objective, while the minority could do so. Neither of
these characterizations is logically flawed and both rest upon factual
foundations. But it is necessary to resort to an analysis of normative
values in order to differentiate the two.44
4 0 Rocket, supra note 12 at 249.
41 Egan, supra note 7 at 574.
42 Invin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 990-91 [hereinafter Invin Toy]. In
the analysis that follows, and in the Appendices, reference is made to laws having "passed" or
"failed" one of the four components of the Oakes test, and to laws being "saved" under s. 1 of the
Charter. These terms are defined in Definition of Terms, below.
4 3 Supra note 38. See Hogg, supra note 3, c. 35 at 17-18 where Professor Hogg also points out
that general objectives will be easier to strike down under the minimal impairment test because
there are more ways to accomplish general tasks than specific ones.
44 This problem is accentuated when the Court re-characterizes the objectives underlying
seemingly comparable legislation, leading to different results under Oakes. For example, in Big M,
supra note 17 at 253, the Supreme Court rejected the objective underlying an impugned "Sunday
Closing Law." It construed that objective as "compelling the observance of a Christian religious
duty" and held that it violated the guarantee of freedom of religion. In contrast, in Edwards Books,
supra note 17, the Supreme Court accepted the objective underlying the impugned law,
characterizing it as providing a day of rest and upholding the legislation. It justified this distinction
on the basis of the division of powers under ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, U.K., 30 &
31 Vict., c. 3, and by characterizing the impugned law in Big M, as religious, not secular in nature
and ultimately, as unconstitutional. It arrived at this determination on the basis of the legislative
history and purpose: that the impugned law was religious in nature, that in order to constitute a
valid exercise of federal criminal power, it had to have a religious rather than secular purpose, that
its objective failed to justify limiting freedom of religion, and that, therefore, it was unconstitutional.
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The Supreme Court, in the first decade following Oakes, applied
the "pressing and substantial" test to legislative objectives that were
characterized with varying degrees of generality. 45 In most cases, this
ensured that the impugned law would pass this first branch of the Oakes
test. Had the Court evaluated legislative objectives that had been
characterized specifically, more legislative provisions likely would have
failed the "pressing and substantial" test.46
The analysis developed later in this article assesses the general or
specific nature of the objective underlying the impugned provision as one
component within a more extensive normative analysis. 47 This can avoid
overstating the importance of the objective of the impugned provision in
the context of other normative values. As McLachlin J. appropriately
emphasized in RR-MacDonald, "If the objective is stated too broadly,
its importance may be exaggerated and the analysis compromised." 48
B. Rational Connection Test
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invoking
section 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified.
This involves "a form of proportionality test" ... . Although the nature of the
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be
In contrast, the Supreme Court inferred that, in Edwards Books, the impugned law was provincial,
not federal, that it had a secular, not a religious purpose, that it sought to provide a day of rest for
workers in the province, and that it constituted a valid exercise of provincial powers.
45 See, for example, the Prostitution Reference, supra note 19 at 1136 in which the Supreme
Court construed the objective underlying the impugned legislation broadly, as eliminating the
nuisance of street solicitation. But see Rocket, supra note 12, in which the impugned legislation
passed the objective test, but failed the minimal impairment test. See also Part II(C), below.
46 As McLachlin J. aptly observed in RJR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 335: "The question at
this stage is whether the objective of the infringing measure is sufficiently important to be capable in
principle of justifying a limitation on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution"
[emphasis added].
47 See Part IV(B), below.
48 Supra note 8 at 335. McLachlin J. stated more fully:
Care must be taken not to overstate the objective. The objective relevant to the s. 1
inquiry is the objective of the infringing measure, since it is the infringing measure and
nothing else which is sought to be justified. If the objective is stated too broadly, its
importance may be exaggerated and the analysis compromised [emphasis in the original].
It is to be expected, and hoped, that most objectives of the legislature are appropriate, according
with the higher values and principles of a free and democratic society. A high percentage of cases
failing this stage of the Oakes test would indicate either a judiciary that is extremely activist, or a
legislature whose actions violate the long-established principles and values of a constitutional
democracy in domestic and international law. Viewed either way, such results would be
dysfunctional.
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required to balance the interest of society with those of individuals and groups. There
are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, the
measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They
must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be
rationally connected to the objective.49
The Court applies the rational connection test after it has
established that the objective underlying the impugned provision
potentially warrants limiting a Charter right. At this stage, it is
determined whether the particular means chosen pursue the
government's objective rationally.
This second stage of the Oakes test clearly narrows the net of
constitutionality further than the first stage. While 97 per cent of
violations have survived the first stage of the Oakes test, a lesser
majority, 86 per cent of violations, have been found to possess a rational
connection.50 Where the rational connection test failed, the Court held
that the legislative means was either not well-designed to achieve its
objective, was arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations.S/
Monahan and Petter provide a plausible reason as to why most cases
pass the rational connection test:
It is always possible to object to the policy underlying a law, but how can it ever make
sense to claim that a law is "irrational"? Taken literally, this claim suggests that a law has
been enacted without reasons. The legislature has apparently drafted a law that is
unconnected to the purposes that give rise to the law in the first place.52
For example, in Oakes, Dickson C.J. found that the reverse onus
contained within section 8 of the Narcotics Control Act5 3 was not
rationally connected to the objective of the impugned law. He evaluated
the legislature's chosen means and the connection of the means to the
law's objective and concluded: "In my view, section 8 does not survive
this rational connection test. As Martin J.A. of the Ontario Court of
49 Oakes, supra note 2 at 139.
50 See Appendix A, Table 1, below.
51 For a recent example, see Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 at
404-05 [hereinafterBenner], where Iacobucci J. stated:
The relevant question is whether the discrimination is rationally connected to the
legislative objectives. We must therefore ask not whether it is reasonable to demand that
prospective citizens swear an oath and to make these demands only of children of
Canadian mothers, as opposed to those of Canadian fathers. There is clearly no inherent
connection between this distinction and the desired legislative objectives: children of
Canadian mothers are not in and of themselves less committed or more dangerous than
those of Canadian fathers [emphasis in original].
52 Supra note 22 at 109.
53 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1.
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Appeal concluded, possession of a small or negligible quantity of
narcotics does not support the inference of trafficking." 54
Dickson C.J.'s conclusion appears to stand for the proposition
that the legislative provision was arbitrary, unfair or irrational, because it
would penalize too many of the wrong persons. He inferred, therefore,
that the law would not achieve its objective.55
The problem with the application of the rational connection test
since Oakes is that courts tend to construct a formal means-ends
relationship between the legislative provision and its purpose. This
disregards the substantive norms in which Dickson C.J. grounded the
test. An extreme example is for a court to hold that a measure justifying
infanticide is "rationally connected" to the objective of reducing the rate
of starvation: There is a causal connection between the number of
persons living and the number of persons who would starve in the
absence of the practice of infanticide, but this is hardly a "rational"
strategy. To hold that such a connection is "rational" is to deprive that
term of its meaning-it is to ignore Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard of
justification, which grounds the rational connection test in the values of
a free and democratic society.S6
The word "rational," in the rational connection test established
in Oakes means more than simply "effective." Combatting starvation is a
pressing and substantial objective, but killing off citizens to reduce the
population so that the government can feed other citizens is an
"arbitrary," "unfair," and "irrational" means to that end, however
effective it might be for the survivors. The means employed should
5 4 Oakes, supra note 2 at 142, Dickson C.J.
55 The Supreme Court held that the government had failed to pass the rational connection
test in the following cases. In R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, five out of seven justices held that
the impugned law failed the rational connection test. In Morgentaler, supra note 8, four out of seven
justices held the impugned law had failed the rational connection test. In Zundel, supra note 20,
four out of seven justices held that there was no rational connection. In Andrews, supra note 38,
three out of six justices held that there was no rational connection. In Committee for the
Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, five out of seven justices held that there
was no rational connection. In Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, five out of nine justices held
that there was no rational connection. In Benner, supra note 51, a full panel unanimously found no
rational connection.
56 In Egan, supra note 7, the Supreme Court almost struck down the impugned law on grounds
that it lacked a rational connection to its valid objective. Five of the nine justices found an
infringement of section 15. However, Sopinka J., in holding that the provision passed the Oakes
test, saved the provision. This article critically evaluates Sopinka J.'s reliance upon "rational"
assumptions about the norms governing judicial decisionmaking under s. 1 of the Charter. See
especially Part III(A), below. However, it is also significant that Sopinka J. construed the rational
connection test more restrictively than the five justices who found that the impugned law was not
rationally connected to its objective. For case comments on Egan, see generally supra note 7.
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represent more than a mere formal or mechanical connection to the
legislative objective. The means should be rationally connected to the
values underlying the Charter.S7
Our analysis in Part IV conceives of the rational connection test
both normatively and methodologically. It improves upon the Oakes
analysis by shifting from a purely formal means-ends relationship to an
examination of the substance of the connection, including its effect. It
also enables decisionmakers to assess the arbitrariness or unfairness of
the legislative means chosen.S8
C. Minimal Impairment Test
Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense should
impair "as little as possible" the right or freedom in question ... .59
The minimal impairment test has been pivotal to section 1
analysis. To date, a majority of the Court has found fifty out of eighty-
seven violations to be unconstitutional by virtue of its application of the
Oakes test.60 Forty-three, or 86 per cent, of these fifty infringements
passed both the objective and rational connection tests but failed the
minimal impairment test.61 Additionally, where a majority of the Court
applied the Oakes test, every piece of legislation that survived scrutiny
under the minimal impairment stage was held to have passed the Oakes
test.6 2 As Professor Hogg recognized, the minimal impairment test "has
turned out to be the heart and soul of s. 1 justification." 63
This test, as set out by Dickson C.J. in Oakes, arises only after
the Court has established: the existence of a pressing and substantial
57 Certainly, if only a mere means-end connection is sought, a high percentage of cases will
present legislative means that are rationally connected to their objectives, whether or not they
minimally impair Charter guarantees or have disproportionate effects relative to the importance of
the legislative objective. It may appear that the second and third stages of the proportionality test
should safeguard against the shortcomings of a formalistic use of the rational connection test. But
as we see in Part II(C-D), below, there is reason to doubt this assumption as the minimal
impairment test is frequently relaxed, and the proportional effects test is not used.
58 On these claims, see Part IV, below.
59 Oakes, supra note 2 at 139.
60 See Appendix A, Table 1, below and accompanying footnotes. See also Appendix B, Tables
2-3, below.
61 See Appendix B, Table 3, below.
62 See Appendix B, Table 3, below.
63 Hogg, supra note 3 c. 35 at 30.
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objective that is capable of grounding an infringement of a Charter right;
and that the impugned law is rationally connected to that important
objective. The minimal impairment test assesses whether or not the
impugned law satisfies that objective with minimal intrusion upon
fundamental rights relative to other possible and practical legislative
means of pursuing its objective. The test thereby further narrows the
scope of constitutionality.64
Courts have differed as to the manner in which the minimal
impairment test ought to be applied. Key differences among Supreme
Court judges revolve around the extent to which judges ought to defer to
the legislature's will in applying it. In Oakes, for example, the Court held
that the law must impair the right or freedom "as little as possible."65 In
Edward Books66 Dickson C.J., writing for the majority, held that the law
must limit the right or freedom "as little as is reasonably possible."6 7
Dickson C.J. added in that case, that, in applying the minimal
impairment test, the courts are "not called upon to substitute judicial
opinions for legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise
line."68 La Forest J., in a concurring decision, also expressed these
concerns. He stated that, although the legislature must use the least
drastic means to reach its objective, "a legislature must be given
reasonable room to manoeuvre." 69 The Supreme Court assumed an
even more cautious approach in the Prostitution Reference, stating that
courts are ill equipped "to second-guess the wisdom of policy choices
made by our legislators." 70
The flexible standard that the Supreme Court applied to the
minimal impairment test during the first decade since Oakes has
64 On cases failing the minimal impairment test, see for example, R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2
S.C.R. 636; R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633; R. v. Logan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731; R. v. Hess, [1990] 2
S.C.R. 906; Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford]; Devine v. Quebec (A.G.),
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 790; and Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591. On cases that passed
the minimal impairment test, see for example, P, v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3; Prostitution Reference,
supra note 19; Canadian Newspapers v. Canada (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 ; BCGEU v. British
Columbia (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214; and United States ofAmerica v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469
[hereinafter Cotronil.
65 Oakes, supra note 2 at 139. This case dealt with a reverse onus provision in the Narcotics
ControlAct, supra note 53.
6 6 Supra note 17. This case dealt with Sunday shopping laws. See supra note 44.
67 Ibid. at 772.
68 Ibid. at 782.
69 Ibid. at 795.
70 Supra note 19 at 1199. This case dealt with a law directed at eliminating street solicitation.
See supra note 45.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
afforded legislatures considerable "manoeuvring room;" it has also led
to the conflation of minimal impairment issues with proportional effects
issues.7 1 For example, where a legislative objective is characterized
broadly and a lower level of scrutiny adopted under the minimal impair-
ment test, the overwhelming inference is that the importance of the
provision must be proportional to any deleterious effects it may have.72
This test has also evolved into a repository for under-unarticulated
normative choices that should properly be explained under the
proportional effects branch of the Oakes test.73 At the very best, this
application of the minimal impairment test "makes for an unpredictable
jurisprudence."74 It is most suspect, however, when it fails to take
account of the values underlying government action and the values that
are impacted upon by those values. The analysis we develop later seeks
to accomplish this end.75
D. Proportionate Effects Test
Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been
identified as of "sufficient importance." 76
71 An overbroad characterization of the objective-a problem mentioned in Part IH(A),
above-would result in a high failure rate under minimal impairment, unless a less strict level of
scrutiny were applied. The broader the objective, generally, the more ways there are to achieve it.
See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
72 However, this is not certain if other alternatives are not explored under minimal
impairment. Perhaps less serious effects could have been incurred. The broad objective may distort
the importance of the provision. Both factors impact upon the result reached under the
proportional effects test without there being any real evaluation of the values at stake.
73 See also, Monahan & Petter supra note 22 at 108-25, where the authors writing shortly after
Oakes, speculated that the determinative task of "allowing the court to overturn legislation without
appearing to be a super-legislature," ibid at 108, might be shared between the rational connection
and minimal impairment tests.
74 Hogg, supra note 3 c. 35 at 35-36. Professor Hogg aptly observed that, in relation to Oakes,
Edwards Books, and the Prostitution Reference:
[I]t does not take a vivid imagination to devise a law that would be less intrusive of the
applicable Charter right than the law which was enacted. But the Court was willing to
defer to the legislative choice on the basis that the choice was within a margin of
appreciation, a zone of discretion in which reasonable legislators could disagree while still
respecting the Charter right. ... The result makes for an unpredictable jurisprudence, but
there is no practical way to avoid uncertainty in the application of the requirement of
least drastic means.
75 See Part IV(B), below.
76 Oakes, supra note 2 at 139.
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The final sub-test in Oakes requires that the government prove
that the effects of the law are proportional to the importance of the
objective and the violation of rights arising from it. This sub-test was
later refined by the majority of the Court in Dagenais v. Canadian
Broadcasting Corp.:77
[T]here must be a proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures which
are responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the objective, and there
must be a proportionality between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures.7 8
The proportionate effects test plays a wholly vestigial role within
section 1 decisionmaking. The authors' survey of section 1 jurisprudence
found 115 infringements to which either a majority or minority of the
Court applied the Oakes test. In every instance in which the minimal
impairment test was passed, the proportionality test was passed. In
every instance that the minimal impairment test was failed, the
proportionality test was either failed or not considered. 79
Professor Hogg describes the proportionality test as
"redundant," stating that "an affirmative answer to the ... sufficiently
important objective [step] will always yield an affirmative answer to the
... [final] step-proportionate effect."80 However true Professor Hogg's
conclusion may be regarding judicial practice, it is not compelled by the
logic of Dickson C.J.'s formulation of the Oakes test. Under Dickson
C.J.'s analysis, the proportionate effects test has the function of
balancing the benefits of the infringement against its deleterious effects,
as measured by the values of a free and democratic society. As
legislation is typically assumed to bring about intended consequences,
the importance of its objective (determined on the basis of the first
sub-test under Oakes) should be factored into the weighing of its
benefits. But, while the Court has determined that the infringement falls
within the minimal range, it remains to be shown that this particular
provision's benefits balance the detrimental effects of this "minimal
impairment." These are distinctly different analyses. McLachlin J.
77 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [hereinafter Dagenais].
7 8 Ibid. at 889 [emphasis in original].
79 See Appendix B, Table 1, below.
80 Hogg, supra note 3 c. 35 at 37. Professor Dale Gibson observes that, as a matter of judicial
practice, the Court has rendered the final stage of the Oakes test, on proportionality, non-
determinative: "What has tended, therefore, to happen, is that the final 'means' component has
been ignored, and the Oakes formula has been boiled down to a simpler three-step test": "The
Deferential Trojan Horse: A Decade of Charter Decisions" (1993) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 417 at 441.
Gibson does not, however, proclaim this final test "redundant."
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describes how the proportional effects branch can be deprived of its
crucial role:
First, to argue that the importance of the legislative objective justifies more deference to
the government at the stage of evaluating minimal impairment, is to engage in the
balancing between objective and deleterious effects contemplated by the third stage of
the proportionality analysis in Oakes. While it may not be of great significance where this
balancing takes place, care must be taken not to devalue the need for demonstration of
minimum impairment by arguing the legislation is important and the infringement of no
great moment. 81
According to Professor Hogg's analysis, if the deleterious effects
of a law are held to be disproportionate to the importance of the
legislative objective, the objective could not justify limiting a Charter
guarantee. Given that previous branches of the Oakes test have already
decided that the objective is pressing and substantial, that the means
chosen are rationally connected to the objective and that the means
minimally impair the guarantee that is infringed, Professor Hogg
concludes that the law must be an acceptable cost for its benefit.
The problem with Professor Hogg's argument is that the
importance of the legislative objective must warrant some as yet
undetermined legislative action that would limit a Charter guarantee. But
the analysis of the legislative objective early in the Oakes analysis
operates at a very general level, allowing the Court considerable latitude
in characterizing the objective. It is not a foregone conclusion, after this
early stage, that the means chosen by the legislature could not have
effects that are more detrimental than the objective is beneficial.8 2 It
must not simply be assumed that deciding there are no more minimally
impairing alternatives also answers whether the benefits outweigh the ill
effects. Nor is deciding that the objective is pressing and substantial an
answer to the question of whether the ill-effects of the provision are
proportional to the benefits of the provision. This balancing of values
under the proportionate effects test of Oakes, therefore, is not redund-
81 RIR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 347, McLachlin J.
82 In addition, the means chosen may be rationally connected to its objective and minimally
impair the guarantee, but the impairment may be minimal relative to any other practical alternative
means. It is still possible, realistically and not merely theoretically, that legislative pursuit of the
objective is not worth the deleterious effects. That is, the absence of a law may be preferable to the
best designed law, in achieving a pressing objective, because even the best designed law may still
impact too harshly on other important values in society. That Charter guarantees are minimally
impaired relative to other possible means, and the law is designed to effectively bring about the
objective, does not mean that such pursuit of one important objective could not disastrously impact
upon many other important values.
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ant.8 3 As will be demonstrated later, it is a necessary process in any
viable approach to section 1.84
E. Conclusions
The Supreme Court accorded priority to Dickson C.J.'s method-
ological four-part Oakes test but effectively ignored his normative
standard in the first ten years following Oakes. It seldom resorted to this
normative standard in its methodological construction of the Oakes
test.8S The four-part Oakes test remains central to its section 1
analysis.8 6 This article demonstrates that it remains central even after
83 Illustrating the cursory treatment of the proportionate effects test is Edwards Books, supra
note 17, where Dickson C.J. states, at 783: "The infringement is not disproportionate to the
legislative objectives. A serious effort has been made to accommodate the freedom of religion of
Saturday observers, in so far as that is possible without undue damage to the scope and quality of
the pause day objective." Had the Supreme Court invoked the proportionate effects test in that
case, it would have been able to evaluate whether the infringement of rights of those who did not
observe a Sunday Sabbath was disproportionate to the value of providing a day of rest to workers in
the province.
84 See Part IV(B), above. Given that the proportionate effects test is the narrowest branch of
the Oakes test, it might be expected to catch the least number of cases under s. 1. The bulk of
legislative provisions that are not reasonable and demonstrably justifiable will already have been
caught. But this is no real comfort, as courts are not, in fact, engaging in this balancing of values.
They are construing, instead, the rational connection test narrowly and the minimal impairment test
loosely. The Court, at most, only tacitly balances legislative effects against legislative objects. The
Court's conclusion as to which is weightier must be inferred from the conclusion reached in earlier
parts of the analysis. However, there is no guarantee that the balancing is justified, nor that it took
place at all. Treating the last test as a foregone conclusion is a potentially dangerous oversight. On
the Court's unwillingness to engage in balancing rights against limitations under s. 1 of the Charter,
see for example, P. Blanche, "The Criteria of Justification Under Oakes: Too Much Severity
Generated Through Formalism" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 437 at 439, "It has also preferred to resist, to a
very large extent, its mandate to balance interests and rights and freedoms."
85 See Part II(A-D), above.
86 On the mechanical application of the Oakes test, see for example, Chapman, supra note 6 at
882, where the author argues: "In each of these cases [applying the Oakes test], however, as in
Oakes, arguments and assertions about this balancing exercise are subordinated to formalist modes
of reasoning and traditional approaches such as legislative deference." Chapman stresses the
attendant lack of normative analysis in the Court's s. 1 decisions: "The reasons for Charter
judgments are often difficult to discern, for the language of the judiciary masks the political and
moral choices they are making behind a rhetoric of legalism": ibid. at 894. For comparable criticism
of the Court's resort to formalism in applying s. 1, see D. Stuart, "Will Section 1 Now Save Any
Charter Violation?" (1991),2 C.R. (4th) 107.
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normative considerations are reintroduced in Egan, RJR-MacDonald and
subsequent cases.8 7
The structure of the Oakes test itself is partly to blame for the
failure of the Supreme Court to implement Dickson C.J.'s ultimate
standard of justification. First, upholding legislative objectives that are
general while challenging those that are specific in the first stage can
leave general laws that limit Charter guarantees open to easy attack on
the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test. There are numerous
ways to fulfil a broad objective, but fewer to fulfil a narrow one.88
Second, a broad characterization of the government's objective can skew
the "proportional effects" analysis: a broad objective is likely to be of
greater importance than all but the most grievous effects of
infringements upon Charter guarantees. Moreover, if the governmental
objective in adopting the infringing provision is unduly magnified at the
first stage of the Oakes analysis, the balancing of values at the
proportionate effects stage is likely to be rendered dysfunctional.8 9
In effect, as it rarely resorted to the objective and rational
connection tests, the Supreme Court of Canada avoided questioning
government policy in its application of section 1. It relied almost
exclusively upon the minimal impairment test. It affirmed the law-
making autonomy of the legislature,90 subject only to evaluating whether
it could have achieved its objective by less invasive means. The message
to the legislature was:
[G]iven that you have decided to pursue this goal, you have done so inefficiently. There
are other legislative devices available that would allow you to pursue the same goal, but
in a manner that would be less restrictive to individual liberty.9
In relying upon a minimal impairment test that evaluated,
primarily, whether the government could have achieved its objective by a
less intrusive means, the Supreme Court accepted, as its primary norm,
that the legislature's law-making authority determined the scope of
8 7 These cases include: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [1996] 3 S.C.R.
480 [hereinafter CBC]; Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 [hereinafter Adler]; Ross, supra note 9;
and Harvey, supra note 9.
88 Hogg, supra note 3, c. 35 at 17-18. See also supra notes 48 (and text accompanying it) and
71.
8 9 Ibid. c. 35 at 36-37. See also note 48.
90 See for example, Stuart, supra note 86 at 109, where the author states: "Whether a limit can
be demonstrably justified under s. 1 almost always turns on what has become known as the 'minimal
intrusion' test."
91 Monahan & Petter, supra note 22 at 108 [emphasis in original].
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Charter rights. It did not evaluate whether the norms or values
underlying the legislation themselves violated Charter rights or freedoms.
The result was that the Supreme Court avoided articulating values that
are necessarily engaged by a section 1 inquiry. This restricted evaluation
of policy choices was possible only by neglecting Dickson C.J.'s ultimate
standard.9 2 It is not that the Court needlessly deferred to the
legislatures' will. In fact, the majority of the Court declined to save 60
per cent of rights-infringements on grounds of not satisfying the Oakes
criteria.93 The problem is that the Court failed to identify and weigh
normative values engaged by those infringements. This failure impeded
it from drawing a defensible line between deference towards and disdain
for the legislature's will. 94 Until courts are willing to articulate, in a
principled and comprehensive manner, both the values that underlie
governmental action and the values effected by the infringement of
Charter rights, section 1 decisionmaking will appear to be grounded in
the unarticulated normative preferences of the judiciary. Until the
Court is willing to avoid seemingly clandestine normative
determinations, the risk is that it will appear that it is arriving at
unpredictable and arbitrary results.
We conclude, therefore, that prior to RJR-MacDonald, the
Supreme Court of Canada failed to invoke the ultimate normative
standard set out by Dickson C.J. in Oakes. Notwithstanding Dickson
C.J.'s own acknowledgment that section 1 decisionmaking must be
grounded in the values of a free and democratic society, the judicial
assumption for the next decade was that it is necessary for judges to
consider the four methodological components of the Oakes test, but not
Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard. As a consequence, the minimal
impairment test has been the major determinant of the constitutionality
of limits upon rights under section 1.95
92 On the Supreme Court's failure to engage Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard of justification
in Oakes, see for example, E.P. Mendes, "In Search of a Theory of Social Justice: The Supreme
Court Reconceives the Oakes Test" (1990) 24 R.J.T. 1 at 5-6.
93 See Appendix A, Table 1, below. In 47 applications of the Oakes test where the Court was
unanimous that there was an infringement of a Charter guarantee, a majority of the Court failed the
infringement on twenty-four occasions (51 per cent of the time). Most infringements were failed
with respect to the last two components of the Oakes test: see Appendix B, Tables 1 and 3, below.
94 Mendes attributes this failure of the Supreme Court to engage in normative analysis to an
undue readiness to fall "into the dark recesses of Charter precedent": supra note 92 at 6.
95 See Appendix A, Table 1 and Appendix B, Tables 1 and 3, below. This standard of
justification was revived, in a somewhat different form, by La Forest J. in his dissenting judgment in
RJR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 269-72. This decision is addressed in detail Part IV(B), below.
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Rather than strike an equilibrium between normative
considerations and adherence to principle in applying the Oakes test, the
Court during the first decade following Oakes, neglected to articulate
and balance fundamental and underlying normative values. 9 6 It
emphasized, instead, the four-fold specific standard of justification set
out by Dickson C.J. in Oakes. In not fully articulating the normative
basis for its decisions, the Court appeared to place method over
substance in spite of Dickson C.J.'s exhortation to articulate and protect
the values underlying the Charter.
III. THE SUPREME COURT RESHAPES OAKES
The Supreme Court, commencing with Egan,9 7 but more
cogently with RJR-MacDonald,98 has modified its use of the section 1
inquiry in a most important respect. It has accepted that normative
inquiry is an essential aspect of the Oakes test and that not engaging in
such an inquiry limits the Oakes test's probity. As was articulated in Part
II, above, this development in the Oakes test is significant and
praiseworthy, but it is also fraught with difficulty. There is still evidence
of the Court's reluctance to encompass the full range of normative
considerations that are appropriate to a section 1 inquiry, as envisaged
by Dickson C.J. in Oakes. There is further doubt about the extent to
which the Supreme Court now grounds its Oakes-Plus approach in a
normative standard, or whether it integrates its normative inquiry into
the four methodological sub-tests set out in Oakes. Two risks arise from
96 The tendency of courts applying the Oakes test to avoid normative analysis under s. I has
led some commentators to challenge the logical and rational basis of judicial reasoning under that
section. See for example, Mendes, supra note 92 at 14, who argues: "Sometimes the court may not
even consciously realize that a particular political sensibility is the driving force of its Oakes Test
analysis and application. In many cases, one would almost require a form of judicial psychoanalysis
to determine what factors were determinative of an Oakes Test application [footnote omitted]." At
times, the Court has adverted to a normative approach prior to Egan, supra note 7 and RJR-
MacDonald, supra note 8. See, for example, La Forest J.'s majority decision for five justices
(Dickson C.J., L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and Cory JJ.) in Cotroni, supra note 64; and United States
ofAmerica v. El Zein, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, particularly at 1489-90 where La Forest J. writes:
In the performance of the balancing task under s. 1, it seems to me, a mechanistic
approach must be avoided. While the rights guaranteed by the Charter must be given
priority in the equation, the underlying values must be sensitively weighed in a particular
context against other values of a free and democratic society sought to be promoted by
the legislature.
97 Supra note 7.
98 Supra note 8.
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these doubts. The majority of the Supreme Court may treat normative
inquiry under section 1 as peripheral to the methodological sub-tests
enunciated in Oakes. It may also ground its analysis only marginally in
the normative values of a free and democratic society, as mandated by
the Charter. The sub-sections immediately below outline the nature of
these risks. It illustrates them in light of key section 1 cases,
commencing with Egan in 1995.
A. Egan v. Canada
In Egan, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of
section 2 of the federal Old Age Security Act.99 Section 2 states that the
spousal allowance provided for under section 19(1) of the Old Age
SecurityAct is available only to
a person of the opposite sex who is living with [another] person, having lived with that
person for at least one year, if the two persons have publicly represented themselves as
husband and wife.
James Egan and John Nesbit, a gay couple who had lived
together since 1948, argued that this definition of spouse discriminated
against same-sex couples, contrary to section 15(1) of the Charter. Five
of the nine justices found that this definition violates section 15(1).100
However, one of those five justices, the late Sopinka J., went on to find
that the definition was saved under section 1. Sopinka J.'s section 1
analysis tipped the balance in favour of finding that this definition of
spouse was constitutional 01
Sopinka J. began his section 1 analysis by setting out the "context
[within which] the section 1 criteria must be considered."1 02 He then
applied the Oakes test to that "context" by resort to three fundamental
assumptions. His first assumption related to the government's duty to
respond to violations of rights as they arose. He stated: "I agree with the
respondent the Attorney General of Canada that government must be
accorded some flexibility in extending social benefits and does not have
99 R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9 as am. by R.S.C. 1985, c. 34 (1st Supp.), s. 1.
100 For a critical analysis of the different opinions articulated by the justices on the Supreme
Court, see Lessard et al., supra note 7 at 92, 114-17.
101 While we find Sopinka J.'s judgment problematic (see L.E. Trakman, "Section 15:
Equality? Where?" (1995) 6(4) Const. F. 112), we do not directly address Sopinka J.'s substantive
argument here. Rather, we focus on the structure of Sopinka J.'s analysis of s. 1.
102 Egan, supra note 7 at 574.
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to be pro-active in recognizing new social relationships." 103 Sopinka J.'s
second assumption concerned the relationship between Charter rights
and government spending:
It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlimited funds to address the
needs of all. A judicial approach on this basis would tend to make a government
reluctant to create any new social benefit schemes because their limits would depend on
an accurate prediction of the outcome of proceedings under s. 15(1) of the Charter.1 04
His final assumption related to the nature of the violation of rights.
"This Court has recognized that it is legitimate for the government to
make choices between disadvantaged groups and that it must be
provided with some leeway to do so."105
Not surprisingly, in applying the Oakes test, these assumptions
were central to the general "context" in which Sopinka J. grounded his
analysis. In particular, he assumed away two of the four tests within
Oakes, the rational connection and the minimal impairment tests. For
example, Sopinka J.'s second assumption, that government "must be
accorded some flexibility in extending social benefits," 106 justified his
assuming away the rational connection test:
The Attorney General of Canada has taken the position in his factum that "the means
chosen does not have to be necessarily the solution for all time. Rather, there may always
be a possibility that more acceptable arrangements can be worked out overtime." Viewed in
this light, the impugned legislation can be viewed as a substantial set in an incremental
approach to include all those who are shown to be in serious need of financial assistance
due to the retirement or death of a supporting spouse. It is therefore rationally
connected to the objective.
107
To a similar effect, Sopinka J. whittled away the minimal impairment
test in adopting a third assumption, that "it is legitimate for the
government to make choices between disadvantaged groups and that it
must be provided some leeway to do so": 108
With respect to minimal impairment, the legislation in question represents the kind of
socio-economic question in respect of which the government is required to mediate
between competing groups, rather than being the protagonist of an individual. In these
circumstances, the Court will be more reluctant to second-guess the choice which
103 Ibid. at 572.
10 4 Ibid. at 572-73.
105 Ibid. at 573. For comparable, but differently articulated concerns about Sopinka J.'s
doubtful resort to "assumptions," see Wintemute, supra note 7 at 700-701.
106 Egan, supra note 7 at 572.
107 Ibid. at 575 [emphasis added].
108 Ibid. at 573.
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parliament has made. ... I would conclude, as La Forest J. did in McKinney, that I am
"not prepared to say that the course adopted by the Legislature, in the social and
historical context through which we are now passing, is not one that reasonably balances
competing social demands which our society must address."
109
These normative assumptions reflect Sopinka J.'s institutional
philosophy. The Court's section 1 inquiry, in Sopinka J.'s view, is
constrained by the supremacy of Parliament in a free and democratic
society; that constraint is crucial in determining the constitutionality of
governmental spending power; and further, that spending which the
government believes is in the interests of a free and democratic society
presumptively overrides Charter rights and freedoms.
Unfortunately, Sopinka J.'s normative analysis is the product of a
constrained vision of a free and democratic society which he neither
tests, nor elaborates upon, in the context of Mr. Egan, Mr. Nesbit, or
others like them. For example, while Sopinka J.'s third assumption is
derived from La Forest J.'s decision in McKinney," 0 his first assumption
is derived, without further support, directly from the government's
factum. 111
Sopinka J. also does not offer any method of evaluating the
normative virtue of protecting government spending power in a context
in which that power is exercised in an unequal manner or with unequal
effect. In treating governmental spending power as essential to the
operation of a free and democratic society, he does not provide a cogent
rationale for favouring the legislative will in this case over other
alternatives. His judgment simply endorses the functional value of
courts not checking the spending power of elected governments. It fails
to evaluate that function in the context of the specific case at hand.
In effect, Sopinka J.'s decision does take account of value
choices; but these choices are founded upon a somewhat general vision
of the values that inhere in a free and democratic society, as endorsed by
the Charter. His method provides the judiciary with comparatively
unlimited normative choices in preserving governmental spending
power. It also offers no apparent mechanism for normative
accountability by judges: to save government spending power is a fact
that, apparently, is adequate in itself. 12
109 Ibid. at 575-76.
110 Supra note 16.
111 Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112 Carl Stychin, supra note 7 at 104, states:
This degree of deference is quite unprecedented and starkly contrasts with early ringing
pronouncements from the Court on the strictness of judicial scrutiny under section 1
1998]
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The alternative is to conceive of a broader range of normative
values that themselves ground governmental spending power. This
includes moving beyond a vision of a free and democratic society in
which governmental spending is the central value to which all other
Charter values subserve. Certainly, governments are elected to raise and
spend money. But, that is merely one of their functions, offset by other
functions within a democracy. Government spending is an attribute of
democratic action; it is not itself the determinant of a democracy. Nor
ought it to be so conceived if we are to avoid the tyranny of the
majority.1 13
In summary, Sopinka J.'s normative analysis lacks explicit
grounding in the full range of values that underlie the Charter. As such,
it provides an insufficient basis upon which to frame any meaningful
evaluation of legislative encroachments upon individual rights and
freedoms. His analysis is also not framed in the context of the four
methodological sub-tests in Oakes.
B. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)
In RJR-MacDonald,1 14 the Supreme Court determined the
constitutionality of sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18 and 19 of the federal
Tobacco Products ControlAct.l15 These sections restricted the ability of
tobacco companies to advertise their products in Canada (sections 4, 5,
and 6); prevented tobacco companies from distributing samples of their
products (section 8); required tobacco packaging to carry unattributed
health warnings (section 9); and provided for criminal penalties for
violation of these sections (sections 18 and 19).
Two of Canada's largest cigarette manufacturers, RJR-
MacDonald and Imperial Tobacco, argued that these provisions of the
[footnote omitted]. Moreover, the novelty of the case is hardly in itself a basis upon
which to uphold a Charter violation; and financial burden has been held by the Court to
carry only limited weight as a justification.
Compare Bailey, supra note 7 at 348-49.
113 Sopinka J.'s incremental-normative analysis in Egan, supra note 7, contrasts with the
decisions of lacobucci J., at 608, and L'Heureux-Dub6 J., at 569-70. For critical comments on the
reasoning and result arrived at by the Supreme Court in Egan, not limited to Sopinka J.'s, reasoning,
see B.B. Ryder, "Equality Deferred, Again" (1996) 4 Can. Lab. & Emp. LJ. 101; P. MacEachern,
"The Impact of Egan v. Canada on Lesbian and Gay Equality Claims" (1996) 4 Can. Lab. & Emp.
L.J. 87; Stychin, supra note 7; and Beatty, supra note 13.
114 Supra note 8.
115 1988, c. 20, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, c. 14 (4th Supp.), as rep. by S.C. 1997, c. 13, s. 64
[hereinafter TPCA].
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TPCA violated their section 2(b) right to freedom of speech. The
government conceded this section 2(b) violation. As a result, the Charter
issue was disposed of by the Supreme Court's decision under section 1.
La Forest J., writing for four of the nine justices, found that the
TPCA was saved under section 1. At the outset, La Forest J. stated that
he believed the specific "test" arising from Oakes was not definitive of
section 1. When referring to the analysis of section 1 by the trial judge,
Chabot J., La Forest J. stated:
Throughout his judgment, Chabot, J. referred to the requirements set forth in Oakes as a
"test." In so doing, he adopted the view, unfortunately still held by some commentators,
that the proportionality requirements established in Oakes are synonymous with, or have
even superseded, the requirements set forth in s. 1.... The appropriate "test" to be
applied in a section 1 analysis is that found in s. 1 itself, which makes it clear that the
court's role in applying that provision is to determine whether an infringement is
reasonable and can be demonstrably justified in a "free and democratic society." In
Oakes, this Court established a set of principles, or guidelines, intended to serve as a
framework for making this determination.
16
While La Forest J. accepted Oakes as a valid framework for
analyzing section 1, he argued against applying that framework rigidly.
He evaluated section 1 in light of Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard: the
values of a free and democratic society as embodied in section 1 itself.
He also encompassed, as central to his assessment of those values, a
balance between individual rights and community needs. As he
envisaged Oakes, "implicit in the wording of s. 1 [is the requirement] that
the courts must, in every application of that provision, strike a delicate
balance between individual rights and community needs. ... The s. 1
inquiry is an unavoidably normative inquiry ... ."1I7
Maintaining the application of a flexible normative approach to
section 1, La Forest J. argued that the Oakes test should be applied in
two stages. In the first stage, the court is required to explore the
normative context of the impugned legislation and the right violated.
This stage involves determining the degree of deference which the court
ought to accord to the action of government. La Forest J.'s second stage
applies the Oakes analysis to the facts of the case, taking account of the
degree of deference accorded the legislature at the first stage.
Essentially, La Forest J.'s first stage guides the second stage; but the first
stage is not itself determinative of the second stage.1
18
116 R!R-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 269-70.
117 Ibid. at 270.
118 Ibid. at 272, 284.
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Applying this two-stage process to RJR-MacDonald, La Forest J.
assessed the relationship between the tobacco companies' speech rights
and the "core" values of freedom of expression. He concluded that the
tobacco companies' 'speech rights were "as far from the 'core' of freedom
of expression values as prostitution, hate mongering, or pornography
and thus entitled to a very low degree of protection under s. 1."119 La
Forest J. then assessed the TPCA as "the very type of legislation to which
this Court has generally accorded a high degree of deference."120 La
Forest J. found that the government ought to have considerable
discretion in such cases and that courts ought to defer to legislation
enacted in accordance with that discretion. While maintaining that the
Oakes analysis was still applicable, La Forest J. concluded that "an
attenuated level of section 1 justification is appropriate in these
cases."1 21 La Forest J.'s approach to section 1 was to attenuate the
standard of proof for the entire Oakes test. As a result, La Forest J. held
that "it is unnecessary ... for the government to demonstrate a rational
connection according to a civil standard of proof."122
La Forest J.'s analysis in RJR-MacDonald and Sopinka J.'s
analysis in Egan display a number of similarities in their section 1
analysis. Both contemplate an initial stage in their use of the Oakes test
in which they establish an applicable normative context in which to
ground their ensuing analysis. Both treat this analysis as non-
determinative of their subsequent application of the Oakes test; but both
still utilize it to arrive at a preferred result.
La Forest J.'s decision, while flawed, has several advantages over
that of Sopinka J. First, La Forest J. anchors his normative approach in
the language of section 1 itself, specifically in the values of a "free and
democratic society." 123 Second, he applies those values in a more
context-specific manner than Sopinka J. In particular, La Forest J. pays
regard to the specific relationship between individual rights and
community interests in determining the limits of freedom of
expression.124 He is also more prepared to contemplate the manner in
which the legislation impacts upon those individual rights and
119 ibM. at 282-83.
120 Ibid. at 279.
121 ibid. at 284.
122 Ibid. at 290.
123 Ibid. at 270.
124 Ibid. at 279-81.
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community interests.1 25 By this means, La Forest J. avoids the inference
that could be drawn from Sopinka J.'s analysis in Egan: that in almost
any context, governmental autonomy in regard to spending is sacrosanct
under section 1.
C. Post-RTR-MacDonald Decisions
In CBC126 La Forest J. wrote for a unanimous Court. As he did
in RIR-MacDonald, La Forest examined the normative values underlying
the appeal before proceeding to apply the Oakes test.127 In setting out
the normative context, La Forest J. noted the significance of these
values, particularly the value of privacy.128 Unlike RJR-MacDonald,
where La Forest J.'s normative examination resulted in his applying an
attenuated level of scrutiny under section 1 generally, in CBC he did not
identify how the normative values engaged in the appeal were to affect
the application of the Oakes test. He merely set out the value-context
and applied the various sub-tests established in Oakes.129 Only on
reaching the proportional effects test did La Forest J. return to his
normative considerations.1 30 Nor did he link these normative
considerations to his conclusion, that the infringement of section 2(b) of
the Charter by section 486(1) of the Criminal Code is proportional to the
legislative objective.131  With normative analysis being applied
125 Ibid. at 277-78. Further criticism is directed at the opinions of McLachlin, Iacobucci, and
La Forest JJ. in RIR-MacDonald, for not taking account of the effects of the impugned legislation
upon human behavior. For example, Richard Moon, supra note 8 at 2 contends that, "[t]he Court's
behavioural approach suppresses entirely the role of human agency in the communication process
and avoids the question of how cigarette ads effect human behaviour." Moon adds, at 6, "[i]f there
is a victory in this case, it is for a rigid and formal approach to freedom of expression
adjudication-an approach that does not even begin to come to grips with the commercial
domination of public discourse."
126 Supra note 87. This case concerned the appeal of a trial judge's order pursuant to the
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 486(1), excluding the public and the media during part of an
accused's sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court saved the provision under s. 1.
127 La Forest J. identified three different values in the context of the appeal: (1) the value of
courts of criminal jurisdiction having the power to control their own process in furthering the rule of
law; (2) the value of courts having the power to regulate the publicity associated with their
proceedings; and (3) the protection of privacy interests. Ibid at 502-04.
128 Ibid. at 504-05.
129 Ibid. at 505.
130 Ibid. at 512-14.
131 Ibid.
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differently in RJR-MacDonald and CBC, the function of this modified
section 1 analysis appears to be unclear: either it attenuates the overall
burden of proof borne by the government prior to applying the Oakes
test, or it lowers the level of scrutiny in relation to a specific component
of the Oakes test.13 2
La Forest J. also wrote for a unanimous Court in Ross.133 La
Forest J. again began his section 1 analysis by setting out the normative
context of the infringement. But here, as in RJR-MacDonald, he
determined the level of deference that was appropriate in that context
and proceeded to apply that level of scrutiny to all four components of
the Oakes test.134 In effect, he applied an attenuated level of section 1
justification to all four Oakes tests.135
Harvey presents yet another variation on the RJR-MacDonald
theme.136 La Forest J., writing for a majority of six justices, again began
by examining the context of the infringement./ 37 However, he did not
examine that normative context in any detail before he applied the four
sub-tests in Oakes. Nor did he reach any conclusion regarding the
appropriate level of justification before applying these sub-tests under
Oakes.138 It was not until he reached the minimal impairment test that
La Forest J. engaged in normative analysis by addressing the appropriate
level of justification.139 In Harvey he held that
A degree of deference is especially appropriate in this case where the impugned
legislative provisions are aimed at transgressing members of the New Brunswick
Legislative Assembly. Surely the members of that body are in the best positions to
132 See J. Cameron, "The Past, Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom Under The
Charter" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1.
1 3 3 Supra note 9. This case involved discriminatory statements made by a teacher. The Court
had to determine whether an order by a Human Rights Board infringed the teacher's freedom of
expression under s. 2(b) and also, whether that infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
134 Ibid. at 871-79. La Forest identified three contexts: (1) the educational context; (2) the
employment context; (3) the anti-Semitism context. Applying RJR-MacDonald, he lowered the
evidentiary requirements in the present case because the expression infringed fell far short of "core
values" on this normative analysis, ibid.
135 Ibid. at 878-79.
136 Harvey, supra note 9. In that case, a member of the New Brunswick legislature was
convicted of illegal electoral practices and was disqualified from holding electoral office for five
years. The Court considered whether this disqualification infringed the member's rights under s. 3
of the Charter, and if the infringement was justified under s. 1. A majority of the Court held that the
infringement was justified as reasonable in protecting the integrity of the electoral process.
137 Ibid. at 900-901.
13 8 Ibid. at 901-08.
139 Ibid. at 904-06.
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choose between available options when it comes to deterring other members from
breaching trust that exists between them, the electorate and the house as a whole.140
The result, in Harvey, is that Courts still can marginalize normative
analysis under section 1 by over-relying on the more technical
application of the four-fold Oakes test.
D. Conclusions
The Oakes-Plus approach proposed in Egan,141 RJR-
MacDonald,142 and the cases following RJR-MacDonald, have attempted
to reinvigorate Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard in Oakes. But the
Supreme Court has failed to provide a clear normative framework with
which to arrive at an appropriate level of deference. 43 As Iacobucci and
L'Heureux-Dubd JJ. warned in Egan, this new approach threatens to
undercut Charter rights and their underlying values.144
Nonetheless, the apparent endorsement of La Forest J.'s
approach in RJR-MacDonald by the majority of the Court in Harvey is
preferable to endorsing Sopinka J.'s approach in Egan. La Forest J.'s
approach at least attempts to revitalize Dickson C.J.'s ultimate standard
of justification under section 1. It also both expands upon and renders
more explicit the values that ground the Court's normative policies. The
problem with La Forest J.'s approach, however, is that the function of
normative analysis is unclear. It appears to lack adequate and principled
constraints. However beneficial La Forest J.'s approach might be in
addressing normative values under section 1, it sometimes unjustifiably
skews the balancing of those values in favour of mechanics of the four-
fold Oakes test. This is apparent in a case likeHarvey. The harm is that,
in such cases, the virtues of a normative approach towards section 1, now
accepted by the Court, are outweighed by the harm of a "use-it-as-you-
like" methodology.145  This problem is apparent in RJR-MacDonald,
140 Ibid. at 906.
141 Supra note 7.
1 4 2 Supra note 8.
143 See also the reasons advanced by lacobucci and McLachlin JJ. in RJR-MacDonald for
questioning the majority's normative approach, supra note 8 at 351, lacobucci J., and at 329,
McLachlin J.
144 Supra note 7 at 571-72, L'Heureux-Dub6 J., and at 618-19, Cory and lacobucci JJ.
145 In addition to the cases discussed below, see the dissenting opinion of L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
in Adler, supra note 87.
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where La Forest J. takes account of "the nature of the legislation" and
the "nature of the right infringed."146 But his approach does not
establish whether the nature of the legislation and the nature of the right
infringed should be subject to normative inquiry in general, or to
normative scrutiny under each Oakes test. He also does not clarify
whether he intends a single level of normative scrutiny to apply to all
aspects of section 1 justification, or only to one or more of the four
Oakes tests. The post-RJR-MacDonald decisions have done little to
resolve this uncertainty.1 47
The adequacy of the Court's approach towards section 1 of the
Charter depends upon its principled integration of normative
considerations to its method of analyzing section 1. Presently, the Court
accords selective functions to normative considerations which judges
may invoke to direct section 1 decisionmaking as they see fit. If the
approach taken in RJR-MacDonald and Ross is applied, one normative
level of scrutiny may be applied in relation to all aspects of the Oakes
test. If an attenuated level of scrutiny is used to evaluate the pressing
and substantial nature of the objective and the rational connection
between the provision and the objective, a stricter level of scrutiny is
likely under minimal impairment. After all, provisions with broad
objectives that are more tenuously connected to those objectives might
reasonably be expected to be promoted by resort to the least intrusive
measures. Applying a lesser level of scrutiny to minimal impairment and
proportional effects may give rise to provisions with middling objectives
that are tenuously connected to those objectives, that impair rights more
than necessary, and that have ill effects that may outweigh their benefits.
Alternatively, if the approach taken in CBC and Harvey is
applied, the Court may employ normative analysis to arrive at a lower
level of scrutiny in relation to one or more of the four Oakes sub-tests.148
The result, in adopting either approach, is likely to be some level of
deference accorded under section 1. However, the approach adopted in
RJR-MacDonald and Ross is likely to lower the Court's overall level of
normative scrutiny prior to it engaging in a section 1 analysis. The
approach employed in CBC and Harvey, in contrast, is likely to reduce
the level of scrutiny in relation to particular sub-tests enunciated in
Oakes. And there is no way of knowing which approach will be used
14 6 See supra note 8 at 272, La Forest J.
14 7 See Part Ill(C), above.
148 It is odd that the values at stake in minimally impairing a right warrant special attention,
but the values at stake in ensuring proportionality between the ill effects of the infringement and the
benefits of the provision do not.
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beforehand, or why one approach will be used over the other until after
the fact. The result, in adopting either approach, is the inconsistent
integration of normative reasoning into the Court's construction of
section 1.
The willingness of the majority of the Court to accord greater
worth to the diversity of Charter values that are associated with a free
and democratic society, however, does constitute a laudable return to
Dickson C.J.'s original intention in Oakes. The problem, however, lies in
the manner in which these values will affect its section 1 analysis in
subsequent cases. Using Dickson C.J.'s normative analysis to justify a
particular level of judicial scrutiny magnifies and perpetuates the flaws in
the Oakes test because it may be used to arrive at an overly broad
classification of objectives and a lower standard of minimal impairment
on the one hand, or to a cursory examination of minimal impairment or
proportional effects on the other hand. This Oakes-Plus approach is not
sufficient because the normative analysis under section 1 is not
adequately constrained by principles governing judicial reasoning. It
also does not afford either clarity or predictability in decisionmaking.
Opening the door to unbridled normative analysis, ultimately, is no
better a guarantee that Charter values will be protected than the reliance
which the Court placed upon a narrowly interpreted methodology in the
first decade following Oakes.
IV. A NEW APPROACH
A. WhyaNewApproach
The Oakes test, including its latest mutations in the cases
commencing with RJR-MacDonald, is fraught with difficulties. To
summarize, these are:
1. In applying the Oakes test in the first decade following
that case, the Supreme Court neglected the ultimate,
value-based standard of justification. It focused instead
on a mechanical methodology.
2. Rather than apply a stringent standard of scrutiny to
government action, the Court accorded pressing and
substantial importance to governmental objectives, often
with little normative inquiry.
1998]
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3. The Court reduced the link between the legislative
objective and its means to a primarily formal and
value-free criterion.
4. The Court rendered the minimal impairment test into
the pivotal component of section 1 scrutiny. This test has
focused on the legislature's efficacious pursuit of its
objectives.
5. Given that the minimal impairment test required
flexibility in application, this resulted in unarticulated
value choices and unpredictability.
6. The Court tended to ignore the proportional effects test.
7. The latest Oakes-Plus approach has reintroduced
normative analysis into section 1, but only to set the level
of judicial deference and to date, mainly in respect of
violations of section 2(b). (One case, Harvey,149 deals
with a violation of section 3.)
8. This Oakes-Plus test has given rise to uncertainty,
however, because judges sometimes resort to normative
analysis to set the level of deference prior to applying the
Oakes test. On other occasions judges do so while
applying that test.
9. Further uncertainty has arisen because judges sometimes
apply normative analysis to all components of the Oakes-
Plus test: other times, they apply it to only some
components of that test.
10. The Oakes-Plus test has given rise to unexplained
variability in the Court's analysis. This has resulted in
unpredictability.
As a result of these last four factors, the Court has resorted to
unbridled normative analysis proposed in RJR-MacDonald. This has
added to, rather than resolved, some of the problems underlying the
Oakes test. In effect, the Supreme Court has shifted from its all-
encompassing reliance upon a technical Oakes test in the first decade
following Oakes, to a normative approach that is not determinative in its
application to particular cases. The Court's existing section 1 analysis
allows normative considerations to be detached from the factual context
and applied selectively to varying components of the Oakes test. The
result is a section 1 jurisprudence that muddies, rather than clarifies, the
role of fundamental values underlying section 1.
1 4 9 Supra note 9.
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We maintain, for these various reasons, that it is time to return
to the drawing board and devise a new approach to section 1. We
contend further, that this new approach ought to be more consistent
with the principles underlying this section.
B. Returning to the Roots of Section 1
As was set out in the Introduction, an analysis under section 1 of
the Charter should integrate the principled consideration of fundamental
values into the specific context in which the law or other governmental
act has, prima facie, violated a Charter guarantee. As McLachlin J.
writes:
[W]hile remaining sensitive to the social and political context of the impugned law and
allowing for difficulties of proof inherent in that context, the courts must nevertheless
insist that before the state can override constitutional rights, there be a reasoned
demonstration of the good which the law may achieve in relation to the seriousness of the
infringement. 15 0
Consistent with Dickson C.J.'s reasoning in Oakes, this
principled and contextual analysis should commence with the language
of section 1 itself. Again, McLachlin J. explains in RJR-MacDonald:
I agree with La Forest J. that "[t]he appropriate 'test' ... in a s. 1 analysis is that found in s.
1 itself." The ultimate issue is whether the infringement is reasonable and 'demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.'151
It is instructive to return to Dickson C.J.'s interpretation of the
text of section 1. Noting its two functions, namely to guarantee
fundamental freedoms and to justify imposing reasonable limitations
upon them, Dickson C.J. sets up section 1 as a balancing mechanism.
Balanced against one another, in constant tension, are Charter
guarantees and governmental limitations imposed upon those
guarantees. Exclusive and stringent criteria of justification must be met
before the balance may tip in favour of governmental limitations over
Charter rights. This is required by the language of section 1, and the
commitment of the judiciary to uphold Charter rights and freedomsj 5 2
150 RJR-MacDonaldsupra note 8 at 329.
151 Ibid. at 327-28.
152 Oakes, supra note 2 at 135-37, Dickson C.J. For discussion of "reasonable limits" that the
Court placed upon Charter rights during the first decade of the Charter, see Morton, Russell &
Withey, supra note 10.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
By upholding Charter rights and freedoms, except where such
criteria are satisfied, the judiciary preserves the fundamental values of a
free and democratic society protected by the Charter. These underlying
values and principles are the touchstone of judicial decisionmaking
under section 1.153 When balancing the importance of Charter
guarantees and legislative encroachments upon them, the Court must
favour that tension which best promotes the values of a free and
democratic society. In these respects, we endorse the spirit of Dickson
C.J.'s analysis of section I in Oakes.
Dickson C.J.'s analysis is problematic, however, in supposing that
a specific standard of justification, fleshed out as the four components of
the Oakes test, can satisfy the normative values that underlie a free and
democratic society. Given that the language of section 1 requires that
there be a cogent justification for limiting Charter rights, section 1
analysis should compare the importance of the Charter guarantee and its
degree of infringement with the importance of the law or other
governmental act which limits that guarantee. The importance of each
should be measured, ultimately, with respect to the values of a free and
democratic society under the Charter.
As was demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has not engaged
in a comparison between the importance of the Charter guarantee and
the importance of the governmental law or other action.154 This failure
to engage is attributable, in part, to the manner in which judges on the
Supreme Court have construed the Oakes test. But that failure also
derives from limitations that inhere in Dickson C.J.'s construction in
Oakes, of an ultimate standard of justification on the one hand and a
four-part standard of justification on the other. It is in these respects
that we diverge from Dickson C.J.'s construction of section 1 in Oakes.
C. The NewApproach
Dickson C.J.. envisages, as the limiting function of section 1, that
courts are required to compare the governmental objective in issue with
the importance of the guarantee and the effect of its infringement. The
Oakes test, as is demonstrated above,155 simply does not carry out the
comparison properly.
153 Oakes, supra note 2 at 136, Dickson C.J.
1 5 4 See Part II(C-D), above.
155 See Part II, above.
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Under the new test, proposed here, as under the Oakes test, the
burden of proof remains upon the government to establish, on a balance
of probabilities, that the infringement is a "reasonable limit in a free and
democratic society." We propose that this burden should be discharged
through a comparison of the importance of the infringed guarantee and
the importance and reasonableness of its limitation. This is
accomplished by following the four steps below.
Step 1 Assess the importance of the Charter guarantee (i.e., the
particular values underlying it that are infringed in the
particular case) and the degree of its infringement;
Step 2 Assess the importance of the governmental objective and
the relation of the infringing law to that objective;
Step 3 Assess the relative weights of the infringed Charter
guarantee and the infringing law to determine whether or
not the trade-off between the infringed guarantee and
the legislative objective is justifiable in a free and
democratic society.
If the infringed Charter guarantee is found, on a balance of
probabilities, to be weightier than the infringing law, the section 1
analysis terminates and the remedies analysis begins. Otherwise, the
analysis proceeds to step 4.
Step 4 Assess whether the limit is a "reasonable limit" in light of
its effects. This assessment depends upon the Court's
answers to two questions.
(A) Could the same objective be achieved by other
practicable means that would reduce the degree of
infringement?
(B) Do the negative effects of the infringing governmental
action outweigh its positive effects, notwithstanding the
fact that the importance of the purpose and means of the
governmental law or other act is greater than the
infringed guarantee?
If the answer to both (A) and (B) is negative, then the
infringement is reasonable and the government's law is upheld. If the
answer to either (A) or (B) is affirmative, then the limit is not
reasonable and the analysis proceeds to the remedies stage.
The new approach to section 1 analysis can be explained as
follows. When the complainant has discharged the burden of showing a
threshold infringement of a Charter guarantee, the analysis moves to the
1998]
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section 1 stage, which is a four-step analysis. Steps 1-3 of this new
analysis place the burden on the government to justify the purpose of the
impugned law or government act. Step 1 requires the government to
present its view of the importance of the infringement and the Charter
guarantee. Step 1 also allows the plaintiff to rebut that view.156
The second step is for the government to establish the
importance of the impugned law in issue. This requires that it assess the
importance of the governmental objective and the integral relationship
between the governmental action and that objective.
The third step is for the government to establish the relative
weights of the particular infringement and the governmental law. As a
preliminary matter, the government bears the burden of demonstrating
that the law in question is of greater importance than the Charter
guarantee. If the government discharges its burden under step 3, it has
justified its purpose and its means, but the government still must justify
the effect of its action upon the Charter guarantee.S 7
This fourth step requires that the government prove (A) that it
could not reasonably reduce the detrimental effects of its law or action
while maintaining its beneficial effects, and (B) that the beneficial effect
of its law justifies the negative effects of the infringement.
This new approach, we maintain, is consistent with the principles
underlying section 1. It redresses the problems plaguing the Oakes test.
It also remedies difficulties arising out of the manner in which the
Supreme Court has construed the values of a free and democratic
society, both before and after the decision in RJR-MacDonald.
156 As stated above, the government ultimately bears the burden of proving that a Charter
infringement is justified. Nonetheless, the onus of establishing the importance, and degree of
violation, of a Charter right will fall on the complainant.
15 7 BigM, supra note 17 at 334. In particular we recall:
If the legislation fails the purpose test, there is no need to consider further its effects,
since it has already been demonstrated to be invalid. Thus, if a law with a valid purpose
interferes by its impact, with rights or freedoms, a litigant could still argue the effects of
the legislation as a means to defeat its applicability and possibly its validity. In short, the
effects test will only be necessary to defeat legislation with a valid purpose; effects can
never be relied upon to save legislation with an invalid purpose.
We do not claim that the purpose underlying the challenged law should be ignored. We
claim, rather, that the purpose underlying the law should be conceived in light of its effects, not in
disregard of them. As Dickson C.J. maintained in Big M, at 331, "purpose and effect are clearly
linked." However, we do question the risk of courts treating the effects of such laws as mere subsets
of those laws with overriding purposes or objects. This concern arises in relation to Dickson C.J.'s
further statement, at 350, that "intended and actual effects have often been looked to for guidance
in assessing the legislation's object and thus, its validity." On the need to evaluate the effects of
impugned laws as a distinct normative inquiry, see Part II(D), above.
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D. Applying the New Approach
We return to the facts of RJR-MacDonald to illustrate how this
proposed new approach functions. We intend the following merely as a
hypothetical illustration, not as a detailed analysis of the complex
evidentiary and factual issues involved.158 Rather than argue for a
specific finding of the law's constitutional validity or invalidity, we set
out the arguments that would be made on both sides: the government's
and the plaintiffs. The aim is to better articulate the values at stake, and
the ordering of values that would underlie a finding of constitutional
invalidity or validity. We illustrate each step, first, by reference to the
hypothetical arguments of the government and second, by recourse to
the hypothetical arguments of the plaintiff. The aim is to show how
these conflicting values can be weighed in order to arrive at a principled
and predictable decision that engages the normative context.
1. The importance of the Charter guarantee
and its degree of infringement
a) Government's argument
Free expression is a fundamental value in a free and democratic
society.l5 9 However, free expression competes with other fundamental
values that are also deserving of protection, such as the promotion of
public health and the protection of the young.1 60 Depending upon the
nature of the expression, freedom of expression will be accorded varying
degrees of importance.1 61 Its importance and the seriousness of the
limitation imposed upon it should be measured according to their impact
on the values underlying the guarantee set out in section 2(b) of the
Charter. These values include the search for artistic, political, and
scientific truth, the protection of individual autonomy and
158 For example, we simply assume (1) that smoking is harmful to health, and (2) that
advertising has the effect of increasing the sale and consumption of tobacco products. For a basic
summary of the facts of this case, see Part III(B), above. For more details, see La Forest J.'s
judgment in RJR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 222-40.
159 See ibid. at 281-82, La Forest J.
160 On the protection of young persons, see generally, Invin Toy, supra note 42. On the
competition between fundamental values see RJR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 281-82, La Forest J.
161 See RJR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 279-80, La Forest J.
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self-realization, and the promotion of public participation in political
processes.16 2
The government contends that, while the plaintiffs right to
expression is infringed because the legislation limits an expressive
activity, this infringement is not severe for the following reasons. The
commercial expression limited is not strongly related to political, artistic,
or scientific truth; nor is it closely related to individual autonomy or self-
realization, nor to public participation in the democratic process.
Tobacco advertising does not satisfy political, scientific, or artistic
purposes, nor does it further participation in the political process.
Tobacco advertising and promotion aims to inform consumers about and
promote the use of tobacco products. The purpose is to consolidate
market share and maintain profits in respect of a substance that harms
and sometimes kills those who consume it.163 These aims of tobacco
companies are reinforced by their enormous economic power in the
consumer market and the degree to which they use their psychological
sophistication to target less informed consumers within a skewed
"marketplace of ideas." 164 This differential is even larger where the
consumers targeted are children. 65 Therefore, the expression in issue
falls more readily into the category of expression dealt with in
Keegstra,16 6 R. v. Butler,167 and the Prostitution Reference. 68
b) Plaintiff's argument
Freedom of expression is a fundamental value in a free and
democratic society.169 Commercial advertising deserves constitutional
protection due to its importance to the functioning of the marketplace,
in allowing producers to attract consumers, and in enabling consumers
162 See ibid at 280-81, La Forest J., citing Dickson C.J. in Keegstra, supra note 20. See also
Invin Toy, supra note 42 at 976, Dickson C.J., Lamer and Wilson JJ.
1 6 3 See RFR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 283-84, La Forest J.
164 On this skewing of the "marketplace in ideas," see "Transforming Free Speechnsibilitics,"
supra note 11.
165 See RIR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 284, La Forest J.
1 6 6 Supra note 20.
167 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter Butler].
1 6 8 Supra note 19.
169 See, for example, Ford, supra note 64; Invin Toy, supra note 42; Keegstra,supra note 20;
Zundel, supra note 20; and Slaight Communications Inc. v.Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
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to make informed choices.170  While the plaintiff concedes that
consumers should be protected from dangerous products, the issue here
is about who is to make the choice in the use of tobacco products and
about what risks are acceptable in making those choices. Consuming
tobacco is not an illegal activity in most circumstances. The plaintiffs
contend that the consumer is free to determine whether to accept health
risks in the purchase and consumption of tobacco products. If the
government wants to remove that choice, it should outlaw the sale and
consumption of tobacco, rather than extinguish the right to engage in
expression concerning a legal activity.
The plaintiff contends that its right to freedom of expression is
severely infringed because the legislation bans all types of advertising:
informative, brand loyalty, and lifestyle advertising. Moreover, it
deprives the plaintiff of the right to "say nothing," by requiring that it
provide the consumer with unattributed health warnings relating to the
use of tobacco products. This limit upon the plaintiffs freedom of
expression also interferes with the plaintiffs ability to conduct a legal
enterprise, where neither the selling nor the consumption of tobacco is
illegal. This governmental action constitutes an unwarranted intrusion
into the commercial marketplace. It interferes with the capacity of
Canadian companies to market their lawful products; and it undermines
the ability of Canadian consumers to decide upon the level of risk in the
purchase and use of tobacco products which they consider acceptable.
As the law does not reach imported media with tobacco advertisements
and promotions, the law puts Canadian businesses at a distinct
disadvantage in relation to foreign competition.
2. The importance of the governmental objective and
the relation of the infringing law to that objective
a) Government's argument
The government contends that the infringing legislation is
reasonably related to its objective. The government's objective in
enacting this legislation is to promote public health. That purpose is
fundamental to a free and democratic society protected by the Charter,
since it serves as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of many of our most
170 This was recognized in Ford, supra note 64 at 767.
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cherished rights.171  The government's objectives here include:
protecting the health of Canadians and young persons in particular;
heightening consumer awareness of the health risks associated with
tobacco use; raising the awareness of Canadians about risks in the use of
tobacco products, including the public cost of health care; reducing the
inducements for consumers to use tobacco products; and educating
Canadians about the potential health risks arising from exercising the
choice to use tobacco products.172 The government contends, further,
that these purposes underlie the importance of its responsibility, since
the consumption of tobacco products poses a severe threat to public
health. Moreover, advertising directed at promoting the sale of tobacco
products is directly related to its consumption, as is evidenced by the fact
that Canadian tobacco companies spend seventy-five million dollars a
year advertising and promoting the sale of their products.173 Tobacco
consumption is one of the leading causes of illness and death in
Canadian society. It threatens not only the .consumers of tobacco, but
also the general population that is exposed to the danger of second-hand
smoke. It also places a financial burden on Canadians because all
Canadians must shoulder the tax burden of paying for the heightened
cost of medical care for those who become ill due to tobacco use.174
The government asserts that by regulating the promotion,
advertising and labeling of tobacco products, it can arrive at a more
practical and less drastic remedy than by completely prohibiting the sale
or consumption of tobacco. This intermediate remedy also reduces the
risk of criminal action, such as the smuggling of tobacco. It is more
effective than governmental measures that do no more than subject the
sale of tobacco products to health warnings. Finally, these regulations
enable the federal and provincial governments to develop
comprehensive and coordinated strategies by which to better address the
needs of the Canadian public.
b) Plaintiffs argument
The plaintiff contends that the infringing legislation is not
reasonably related to the government's objective. The government's key
171 RIR-MacDonald, supra note 8 at 278, La Forest J.
172 Ibid. at 272.
173 Ibid. at 291.
174 Ibid.
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objective, here, is to protect the health of Canadians by reducing the
consumption of tobacco products. But its legislation attacks the
promotion, advertising and labeling of tobacco products, which has not
been shown to achieve the objective of reducing consumption.
Furthermore, the legislation will not protect Canadian citizens from the
advertisement of tobacco products outside of Canada, leading to the
importation of those products.
3. The relative weights of the infringed Charter
guarantee and the infringing law
a) Government's argument
The government contends that the right to freedom of
expression, guaranteed by the Charter, is outweighed by the importance
of the objectives that underlie the infringing legislation. Maintaining
and enhancing public health, the protection of the young, and the ability
of consumers to make informed choices are all key governmental
responsibilities. While free expression is a fundamental value in a free
and democratic society, the expressive activity in this case is of less value
than the health of Canadians, the need to reduce youth addiction to
tobacco and to inform consumers about the hazards of tobacco
consumption. The expressive activity being infringed in this case is
commercial expression. That activity aims at consolidating and
enhancing the share of tobacco products within a market in which one
third of Canadians are addicted to tobacco. Those attempting to
increase their profit from the sale of tobacco products which sicken or
kill their users, not to mention those who are subjected to second-hand
smoke, should not be accorded the same expressive liberties as those
marketing products that are not harmful to their consumers. Health,
essential to the enjoyment of fundamental rights, must be placed above
profit and market share. There are other ways of making a profit.
Citizens have only one life to lose.
b) Plaintiff's argument
The plaintiff contends that the right to freedom of expression,
guaranteed by the Charter, outweighs the importance of the objectives
that underlie the infringing legislation. The government's measures
have not been shown to reduce tobacco consumption. They completely
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deny the plaintiffs ability to advertise and promote a product whose sale
and consumption is lawful. These measures also deny the plaintiff the
right not to engage in expressive activity, as occurs when tobacco
advertisement is subject to attributable warnings. Prohibiting tobacco
advertising will have a detrimental effect, not only upon the plaintiffs
market, but also upon markets related to the sale and consumption of
tobacco products, such as the market of tobacco vendors. This
constitutes a direct attack upon the freedom to engage in the marketing
of lawful products, to the disadvantage of Canadian businesses and
consumers alike. It also denies the suitability of other measures by
which Canadian citizens choose those risks they are willing to assume in
reaching consumption choices. These other measures do not violate
fundamental Charter rights. They also avoid the public harm that arises
when legislation prevents tobacco companies from advertising to
promote sporting events, sponsor charitable work, and provide revenues
for those promoting such advertisement, such as sports promoters and
magazines.
On the basis of such arguments, the Court decides at this stage
whether the values engaged, on balance, justify the government's
purpose and the means it chose to further that purpose. If the
government's argument fails at this stage, the legislation does not
constitute a justifiable limit upon a Charter guarantee. The section 1
analysis ends; and the Court decides upon the appropriate remedy. If
the government's argument succeeds, then the Court proceeds to step 4.
4. Is the limit a "reasonable limit" upon the
Charter guarantee in light of its effects?
(A) Could the same objective be achieved by other
practicable means that would reduce the degree of
infringement?
a) Government's argument
The government contends that the objective underlying the
legislation could not have been achieved by other practicable means that
would have reduced the degree of the infringement upon freedom of
expression. For example, a partial ban on lifestyle advertising would not
have achieved the government's objective because tobacco companies
could have negated its effect. Alternatively, they could have continued
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to advertise their products by legal means, in conjunction with other
lifestyle advertisements. Attributed warnings about risks to health
arising from the use of tobacco products are likely to have a significantly
reduced impact than the legislation in issue, as such warnings encompass
a perspective on health, not an accepted scientific truth. Rendering
tobacco consumption illegal also gives rise to a black market in tobacco
consumption which subverts the government's purpose. It places an
undue burden upon addicted citizens who wish to remain law-abiding,
but cannot be so in consequence of a law that renders their consumption
of tobacco illegal. It also curtails the activities of tobacco companies and
has a detrimental impact upon their employees, suppliers, and
customers. The economic effect of such radical legislation would be
unduly severe. The gradual approach adopted by the government is
fairest to all the parties involved. It places the greatest importance upon
the health of Canadians. But it also maintains the ability of tobacco
companies to continue their profitable activity.
b) Plaintiffs argument
The plaintiff contends that the government could employ other
practicable means of attaining its objective that infringe upon the rights
of tobacco companies to a lesser degree. This includes imposing a
partial ban on particular styles of advertising. For example, it could ban
lifestyle advertising to protect young persons. It would also require
attributed warnings directed at informing consumers of the possible risks
of tobacco consumption. This alternative satisfies the government's
objective, but it does not infringe upon freedom of expression to the
same extent as the legislation currently being challenged.
(B) Do the negative effects outweigh the positive effects of
the legislation, despite the fact that the importance of the
purpose and means of the legislation is greater than the
infringed guarantee?
a) Government's argument
The government contends that the positive effects of decreasing
tobacco advertising, and consumption, promote health and shield young
people from inducements to consume tobacco. These benefits, even if
only partial, justify the negative effects arising from the limits which the
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legislation in issue places upon the expressive commercial activity. The
protection of health, central to human dignity and liberty, should
precede profit-making and the consolidation of market share.
b) Plaintiff's argument
The plaintiff contends that the negative effects of the legislation
upon the expressive activity of tobacco companies, their profits and
market share, is not justified for these reasons. The legislation is likely
to have only a negligible impact upon the protection of public health.
The burdens it will impose upon a lawful economic enterprise will also
disadvantage Canadian companies in relation to foreign competitors
whose advertisement of tobacco products are not affected by the
legislation.
E. Benefits of the New Approach
We have argued that, despite the adoption of the normative
Oakes-Plus approach by the majority of the Supreme Court since RJR-
MacDonald, the majority still has not enunciated principled criteria to
guide its normative determinations under section 1.175 The result has
been a noticeable pattern in which the Court has displayed normative
preferences in respect of some rights and freedoms, but not others. For
example, since Oakes, the majority has saved infringements on freedom
of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter 52 per cent (fourteen out
of twenty-seven) of the time.176 However, no majority has saved
infringements on liberty under section 7.177 There are plausible reasons
for these discrepancies. For example, the Court may view liberty as more
fundamental than freedom of expression and more deserving of
constitutional protection. It may also believe that unchecked freedom of
expression is more likely to undermine the common good than an
unchecked liberty. But whatever its views may be, the Court has failed
to enunciate principled criteria by which to arrive at its determinations.
175 See Part III, above.
176 See Appendix A, Table 3, below.
177 See Appendix A, Table 3, below. A majority of the Court found an infringement of s. 7
and applied the Oakes test on fifteen occasions. None of these violations was held to be a justifiable
limitation.
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As a further example, the majority of the Court has saved 48 per
cent of the violations of section 11(d), or eleven of twenty-three
violations.178 But of seven violations of section 11(d) considered by a
majority of the Court dealing with constructive murder, none was saved.
Alternatively, violations of section 7 dealing with reverse onus provisions
and restricted defences to statutory offences were saved 77 per cent of
the time.179 Again, there are patently credible reasons for these results.
In saving laws that prevent the Crown from being unable to protect the
public from, for example, drunk drivers, the Court is likely concerned
about the values of public safety and protection, not to mention reducing
the cost of prosecuting offenders. In not saving laws that inflict grave
punishment upon an accused without proof of full mens rea, the Court is
likely protecting individuals from being sentenced out of proportion to
the culpable wrong the Crown can prove was their doing.
Our contention is that, whatever its reasons for saving or not
saving an impugned law under section 1 of the Charter, the Court's
normative assumptions are made in the face of other possible choices.
In addition, the Court grounds each choice in preferred beliefs, despite
its attempt to dress them in the garb of "self-evident" truth. Its decisions
do not speak for themselves. They rely instead on unstated and
unqualified normative assumptions.
The new section 1 approach, proposed in this article, responds to
the criticisms leveled against the existing section 1 analysis. An ultimate
standard of justification-the values of Canada's free and democratic
society-are integral to each step of the new approach. Given that the
words of section 1 require a stringent form of justification, a section 1
analysis should compare the importance of the Charter guarantee with
the importance of the law or action limiting that guarantee. This new
approach is consonant with the values of a free and democratic society
protected by the Charter. It also accords with Dickson C.J.'s ultimate
standard.
However, the new section 1 analysis goes further. It conceives of
the link between the legislative objective and the means chosen to effect
it as more than a formal, value-free criterion. The means used to arrive
at the governmental objective tempers the importance of the law or
178 See Appendix A, Table 3, below. Section 11(d) guarantees the presumption of innocence.
179 A majority of the Court applied the Oakes test to constructive murder provisions on seven
occasions. None of these provisions survived the Oakes test. A majority of the Court applied the
Oakes test to reverse onus provisions or presumptions or provisions limiting defences available to an
accused on thirteen occasions, ten of which survived the Oakes test. See Appendix A, Table 3,
below.
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other governmental act in question. An important objective bolsters the
importance of the governmental means of effecting that objective. In
contrast, a tangential or redundant law lessens the importance of an
even more pressing governmental objective. The purpose and means of
effecting the objective underlying the law, therefore, are integrally
related.
This new section 1 analysis displaces the concept of minimal
impairment as the pivotal component of section 1 scrutiny. According to
our approach, the minimal impairment issue only arises after the
government has proven that, on balance, the law and its objective
outweigh the infringement of the Charter guarantee. The new approach
continues to evaluate alternatives by which the governmental law or
action would have a less detrimental affect; but this analysis arises only
as a fourth step, towards the end of the analysis. The new approach also
acknowledges that the government requires some flexibility: in satisfying
its objectives, in demonstrating that less infringing means are not
workable, and in showing that the positive results of its action outweigh
the deleterious effects. These issues, however, arise only at the end of
the analysis. This helps to limit the manipulation of values, as occurred
under the Oakes test. The new approach also requires that value-choices
be articulated in the first three steps of the new approach. The
anticipated result is greater predictability in judicial decisionmaking
under section 1 of the Charter.
This new approach also combines normative analysis with
contextual sensitivity. The governmental objective is considered in
tandem with the infringing law or act. Similarly, the guaranteed right or
freedom is considered in tandem with the particular infringement. In
rendering these processes parallel, not sequential as occurred under the
Oakes test, the analysis is coherent and clear in its application. This also
reduces the capacity of judges to engage in mechanical manipulation at
the expense of normative reasoning, as occurred under the Oakes test
and unbridled normative analysis, as arose in RJR-MacDonald.
This new approach, while improving upon the Oakes test, is also
compatible with the precepts which underlie Dickson C.J.'s conception
of judicial responsibility in applying section 1 of the Charter. Morever,
judges and lawyers continue to be informed by precedent under this new
test, in determining the manner in which the Court ought to:
A. identify the values underlying the guarantee;
B. assess the degree of infringement;
C. identify the values underlying the legislation;
D. assess the relation between the law or act and the
objective(s) of the legislation;
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E. establish the relative weight of the infringement
compared to the law or act; and
F. establish that the limit was reasonable, despite the fact
that the value of the legislation's objective outweighed
the values of the infringed guarantee.
Courts using the new approach can inform themselves in light of
earlier Oakes analysis in accommodating relations between normative
values and principled reasoning. For example, analysis under Oakes can
be scrutinized to identify the values that underlie a Charter guarantee, to
assess the seriousness of the governmental infringement and to identify
the values underlying the law or other governmental acts in issue. The
Oakes analysis also can be referenced in assessing the relation between
the law or other act and the governmental objective, in the so-called
rational connection test under Oakes. Finally, the Oakes analysis can be
referred to in determining whether the law or act minimally impaired the
Charter guarantee and whether it produced benefits that are
proportional to the ill effects of the governmental intrusion.
But despite the capacity of the Oakes test to identify some
normative values, it continues to have normative limitations. For
example, the first step under the Oakes test, assessing the importance of
the legislative purpose, requires only that that purpose be important
enough "to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or
freedom."180 This has led judges to characterize governmental objectives
broadly, raising them to high levels of generality and making them
appear self-evidently "pressing and substantial." The Oakes test, at that
stage, engages in little comparison between the purpose of the infringed
guarantee and its degree of actual infringement. The proportional
effects stage of the Oakes analysis is all but ignored. The result is that,
under the Oakes test, the legislative objective is rendered important, but
not necessarily more important than the infringed guarantee in relation
to the values of a free and democratic society. In contrast, the new
approach compares the purpose of the limitation directly to the
importance of the purpose of the guarantee and at its third stage, to the
degree of the infringement.
Second, under the proportionate effects test in Oakes, the
importance of the guarantee is modified by its degree of infringement.
The Oakes test does not directly modify the importance of the legislative
objective in light of the importance of the means used to fulfill it. It
maintains, instead, that the means chosen merely be "rationally
180 Oakes, supra note 2 at 138-39, Dickson C.J.
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connected" to that objective. The requirement is, simply, that the
connection not be arbitrary, unfair, or irrational. The result is that the
importance of the impugned law is overstated because a general
objective whose importance is self-evident is allowed to inflate the
importance of legislative means that are of remote and trivial
importance to the government's overall purpose. This is not a
satisfactory way of assessing the relationship between the purpose of a
law or other act and the means chosen to further it. In contrast, the new
test, proposed here, requires an assessment of the importance of the
governmental means chosen to infringe the Charter guarantee in
fulfilling the governmental objective (in step 2).
The only real scrutiny of the means chosen by the legislature
under the Oakes test occurs under the minimal impairment sub-test.
This aspect of the Oakes test has become a "fudging factor." Given that
broad governmental objectives can be pursued in many ways, it appears
that there are other less infringing ways in which to achieve the
objectives. This has resulted in either an unduly strict minimal
impairment standard or a lesser degree of scrutiny when examining the
availability of other means of achieving this legislative objective. The
ensuing harm has been an inadequate assessment of the effects of
legislative means in relation to the values of a free and democratic
society. The new test proposes, instead, that the infringed guarantee
and the limitation should be assessed, not only purposively, but also in
terms of their particular effects.
The Oakes test evaluates the effects of the limitation upon a
guarantee under the minimal impairment test and supposedly, also
under the proportional effects test. The minimal impairment test really
constitutes a comparison of alternative means of realizing the
governmental objective. It does not compare the importance of the
effects of the law with the importance of its effects upon the plaintiff
whose guarantee is infringed. This comparison, supposedly, takes place
under the proportional effects test in which the importance of the
objective is measured against the deleterious effects of the law, and the
positive effects of the law are weighed against their harmful effects. This
has seldom, if ever, been done by the Supreme Court, as it pays only
lip-service to the proportional effects test in practice. The new test
proposes, in contrast, that the Court engage in a full scrutiny of the
effects of the limitation. This occurs at step 4 of our new approach.
The Supreme Court's attempt to reinvigorate Dickson C.J.'s
words from Oakes in RJR-MacDonald and in subsequent cases are
justified by valid concerns. But the solutions at which the Court has
arrived, unfortunately, have distinct limitations. These more recent
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decisions on section 1 appear to invoke the values of a free and
democratic society to lessen the degree of stringency required. This
occurs sometimes prior to the Court applying the Oakes test.
Alternatively, these decisions lower the degree of scrutiny in applying a
particular sub-test of Oakes. This tends to magnify both normative and
methodological defects in the application of section 1. It also fails to
produce a principled reconciliation between the ultimate and specific
standards of justification.
The proposed new approach integrates normative considerations
into a contextual analysis under section 1. This is accomplished by
treating the values of a free and democratic society as important criteria
at all stages of analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
After more than a decade of section 1 analysis, values play an
expanding, but still questionable role in the application of section 1. The
normative assumptions grounding the Supreme Court of Canada's
section 1 inquiry remain clouded either in mechanical reasoning or in
normative vagaries. A court that engages in mechanical reasoning
submerges its normative choices in neutral language. One that shrouds
its normative choices in vagueness denies them a principled framework.
In both cases, the harm is that decisions under section 1 lack a clear
normative foundation and do not give rise to predictable or cogent
results.
With the advent of Egan, and particularly RJR-MacDonald, a
majority of the Supreme Court has endorsed Dickson C.J.'s normative
analysis of Charter infringements in Oakes. That majority has employed
both La Forest J.'s normative analysis in RJR-MacDonald and the
specific sub-tests devised in Oakes. However, the Court has also
adopted a tenuous approach in which it has used values to justify a
particular characterization of a governmental objective, or to analyze
proportionality as enunciated by Dickson C.J. in Oakes.
Section 1 of the Charter plays a vital role in protecting and
refining the values that prevail within the Canadian polity. This includes
determining the permissible scope of our fundamental rights and also
circumscribing governmental action which conflicts with those values.
The balance struck between such rights and laws which undermine them,
we contend, is most fully and vigorously grounded in the values of a free
and democratic society. The Supreme Court has begun to tackle that
balance with normative insight. But it has yet to adopt an integrated,
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principled, and contextual inquiry into the values that underlie section 1
of the Charter. It has also still to apply those values in a consistent and
permanent manner, as was envisaged by Dickson C.J. in Oakes.
The normative reasoning resorted to by the majority of the
Supreme Court since RJR-MacDonald is a positive and laudable step. In
particular, it demonstrates a willingness to engage the values that
underlie a free and democratic society under section I of the Charter. In
not dealing with these normative values in a principled and
comprehensive manner, however, the Court's decisions reflect untested
and unqualified assumptions. The risk is that its unarticulated
normative assumption prior to RJR-MacDonald will be displaced in
favour of untested ones following that case. The harm is that these
assumptions will be grounded in dubious suppositions about levels of
scrutiny, deference to the legislature and the values of a free and
democratic society.
This article proposes an integrated, explicit, and contextual
scrutiny of the values underlying section 1. This will increase the
normative clarity of section 1 decisions. In particular, it will render
judges more accountable for limitations which impugned laws impose
upon rights and freedoms under the Charter. The benefit will be not
only more open recognition of the values that underlie section 1 but the
identification of a more cogent line of deference towards the legislature.
A further benefit will be a more vital comprehension of the values that
underlie a free and democratic society.
VI. DEFINITION OF TERMS
PASSED
The component of the Oakes test is shown as "passed" if more justices
held that the infringement in question met the particular test of that
component, i.e. a pressing and substantial objective, a rational
connection, minimal impairment the right, or proportional effects, than
held that the particular test was not met.
FAILED
The component of the Oakes test is shown as "failed" if more justices
held that the infringement in question did not meet the particular test of
that component, i.e. a pressing and substantial objective, a rational
connection, minimal impairment of the right, or proportional effects,
than held that the particular test was met.
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SPLIT
The component of the Oakes test is shown as "split" if an equal number
of justices held the infringement in question met the particular test of
the component as held that the particular test was failed.
NOT CONSIDERED
The component of the Oakes test is shown as "not considered" if more
justices did not apply the particular test, or did not reach a conclusion
under the particular test, than applied the particular test and reached a
conclusion whether the particular test was passed or failed.
SAVED
The result of an application of the Oakes test is shown as "saved" if a
majority of the Court held that the infringement passed the four
components of the Oakes test.
KILLED
The result of an application of the Oakes test is shown as "killed" if a
majority of the Court held that the infringement failed one or more
components of the Oakes test.
NON-OAKES ANALYSIS
A non-Oakes section 1 analysis is one in which: (a) no evidence is
advanced by the government to justify the infringement; (b) the limit is
not prescribed by law; (c) the law infringing the Charter is a rule of
common-law; (d) the judgment is that the infringement is not justifiable
"on any basis".
MAJORITY
A "majority" of the Court consists of the greatest number of justices who
agree with the reasoning in the judgment.
MINORITY
A "minority" of the Court consists of those justices who do not agree
with the reasoning of the majority. "Minority" in this sense subsumes
both decisions that agree (concur) and disagree (dissent) with the result
reached by the majority.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
APPLICATIONS OF OAKES TEST BY MAJORITY OF COURT*
Element Passed Failed Split Not Cons'd
Objective 84/87-97% 2/87-2% 1/87-1% 0/87-0%
Rational 75/87-86% 8/87-9% 1/87-1% 3/87-4%
Connection
Minimal 35/87-40% 50/87-58% 0/87-0% 2/87-3%
Impairment
Proportional 35/87--40% 14/87-16% 0/87-0% 37/87---44%
Effects
Conclusion 35/87-40% 52/87-60% ..........
of Majority
*The conclusion of the majority of the Court regarding the constitutionality of
the infringements varied slightly from the conclusion of the majority of those
justices applying the Oakes test. Of eighty-seven laws or acts giving rise to
infringements, a majority of the Court held thirty-seven of these laws or acts to
be constitutional. Fifty were held to be unconstitutional. The variation is
explained by two cases in which a majority applied the Oakes test and found that
the law or act failed the test. But a minority held that the law or act passed the
Oakes test and, together with other Justices held that there was no infringement.
The result was that the law passed constitutional scrutiny. The two cases are:
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; and R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 154. The Oakes test was pivotal in these cases, providing the
"swing vote" that saved the infringements in issue.
[VOL. 36 NO. 1
Appendices
TABLE 2
"SAVE RATES" FOR CHARTER GUARANTEES
Saved by Saved by Other
Sea Description Majority Minority Analysis
2(a) Conscience and Religion 3/4-75% 0/1-0%
2(b) Thought, Opinion, and 14/27-52%
Expression
2(d) Association 1/7-14%
3 Voting 1/2-50% 0/1-0%
6(1) Mobility in and out of 1/1-100%
Canada
6(2) Mobility within Canada 0/1-0%
7 Life, Liberty, and 0/15-0% 1/7-14% 1/3-33%
Security of Person
8 Search and Seizure ----- 0/1-0% 0/4-0%
9 Arbitrary Detention 2/3-66%
10(b) Retain Counsel 1/1-100% 0/1-0%
11(d) Presumption of 11/23-48% 1/3-33% 0/2-0%
Innocence
11(e) Denial of Bail without 0/1-0%
Reasonable Cause
11(f) Trial by Jury 1/1-100% 1/1-100%
11(h) Double Jeopardy ----- 1/2-50%
12 Cruel & Unusual 0/1-0% 0/1-0%
Punishment
13 Self-incrimination 0/1-0%
15(1) Equality 3/7--44% 1/7-14%
23 Minority Lang. Educ. --....- 0/1-0%
Total Infringements: 130 37/87-43%
1 J4/28-14%2  3/15-20%3
*See endnotes after Appendix B.
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TABLE 3
"SAVE" RATES BY SUBJECT MATI'ER
Saved by Saved by Other
Sec. Subject Matter Majority Minority Analysis
2(a) General Save Rate 3/4-75% 0/1-0%
Blood Transfusions 1/1-100% .....
Hate Propaganda 1/2-50% .....
Sunday Shopping 1/1-100% .....
Therapeutic Abortion 0/1-0%
2(b) General Save Rate4  14/27-52% ..........
Non-judicial Restrictions 1/86-13% ..........
on Expression 5
Judicial Restrictions on 3/5-60%
Expression 7




2(d)8  General Save Rate ----- 1/7-14%








3 General Save Rate 1/2-50% 0/1-0% -----
Inmates Prohibited from 0/1-0% .....
Voting
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Saved by Saved by Other
Sec. Subject Matter Majority Minority Analysis
3 Disqualification from 1/1-100%
Size of Constituencies 0/1-0%
6(1) General Save Rate 1/11°--100% J .
6(2)I General Save Rate 0/111--0% J ..
7 General Save Rate 0/15--0% 1/712-14% 1/313-33%
Constructive Murder 0/8-0% .....
Restrictions on Defences 0/8-0%
of Vagueness14
Therapeutic Abortion 0/1-0% .....
Detainment of Insane 0/2-0% .....
8 General Save Rate 0/115--0% 0/416-0%
9 General Save Rate 2/317-67% I ....
10(b) General Save Rate 1/118 100% 0/119-0%
11(d) General Save Rate 11/23-48% 1/3-33% 0/220-0%
Statutory Reverse Onus/ 10/13-77% 1/3-33% -----
Removal of Defence
Constructive Murder 0/7-0%
Miscellaneous 21  1/3-33%
11(e) General Save Rate 0/1-0% .....
11(f) [General Save Rate 1/1-100% 1/1-100%
11(h) [General Save Rate .....- . 1/2-50%
12 [General Save Rate 0/1--0% 0/1-0% .
13 IGeneral Save Rate I .. J 0/1-0%
1 General Save Rate J3/7-44% 1/7-14%
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Saved by Saved by Other
Sec. Subject Matter Majority Minority Analysis
15(1) Sex/Marital Status 1/22250% 1/223-50% -----
con'd Age Discrimination 1/224-50% 0/34-0% -----
Citizenship 0/226-0% ..........
Assisted Suicide 1/1-100% ..........
Denial of Funding to ----- 0/2-0% -----
Religious Schools
23 j General Save Rate J .0/1-0%




MINORITIES AND MAJORITIES APPLYING
THE OAKES TEST COMPARED
Element Treatment Majority Minority
Objective Passed 84/87-97% 21/28-75%
Failed 2/87-2% 4/28-14%
Not Considered 0/87-0% 0/28-0%
Split 1/87-1% 3/28-11%
Rational Passed 75/87-86% 15/28-54%
Connection Failed 8/87-9% 4/28-14%
Not Considered 3/87-4% 5/28-18%
Split 1/87-1% 4/28-14%
Minimal Passed 35/87-40% 4/28-14%
Impairment Failed 50/87-57% 18/28--64%
Not Considered 2/87-3% 2/28-7%
Split 0/87-0% 4/28-14%
Proportional Passed 35/87-40% 4/28-14%
Effects Failed 14/87-16% 6/28-21%
Not Considered 37/87-44% 14/28-50%
Split 0/87-0% 4/28-14%
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TABLE 2
OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS OF OAKES TEST
Application # of Infingements # Saved # Failed
Oakes by Maj. 87 37*-43% 50-57%
Oakes by Min. 28 4-14% 24-86%
Non-Oakes 15 3**-20% 12***-80%
*See remark beneath Table I, Appendix A.
**The majority of the Court did not engage in section 1 analysis. The minority
engaging in section 1 analysis in each instance would have held the infringement
to be an unjustified limitation without applying the Oakes test.
***In these twelve instances, the majority of the Court found the infringement
to be unjustifiable without applying the Oakes test.
TABLE 3
OPERATIVE (FIRST FAILED) COMPONENTS OF OAKES TEST
# of First Element Failed
Infrin- # that Rational Minimal Prop.
Judg-ment gements Failed Objective Connect. Impair. Effects
Majority 87 50 2-4% 5-10% 43-86% 0-0%
Minority 28 21 4-19% 3-14% 14-67% 0-0%
Majority or 115 93* 13-14% 20-21% 60-65% 0-0%
Minority
*The Oakes test was failed a total of seventy-one times by a decisive number of
either a majority or minority of the Court. In a further twenty-two instances, a
justice or justices held that an infringement failed the Oakes test; but a greater
number of the majority or minority applying the test did not.
ENDNOTES
1. Where a majority of the Court applied the Oakes test to the infringement, 37/87 were found to be
constitutional.
2. Where a minority of the Court applied the Oakes test to the infringement, 4/28 were found to be
constitutional.
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3. Where the Court's s. 1 analysis did not engage the Oakes test, 3/15 infringements were found to
be constitutional.
4. After this study was concluded, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Libman v. Quebec
(A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569. At issue was provincial referendum legislation placing limits on
spending permitted during the referendum campaign. The Court unanimously held that this law
violated both section 2(b) and (d) and failed the minimal impairment test.
5. These violations exclude non-judicial restrictions on expression placed on illegal activities and
hate speech listed below. The eight restrictions enumerated here are in relation to: advertising
cigarettes (RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1985] 3 S.C.R. 199); advertising by dentists
(Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232); advertising directed at
minors (Invin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927); advertisements and solicitation at
airports (Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139); the
prohibition of English signs and advertisments (Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; and
Devine v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790); and posters placed on public property (Ramsden v.
Peterborough (City), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084).
6. The violation that was saved related to advertising directed at minors. See Irwin Toy Ltd. v.
Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
7. Judicial restrictions on expression considered as violations of s. 2(b) have been: the exclusion of
the media from sentencing proceedings; publication restrictions dealing with matrimonial matters
and civil proceedings; the prohibition of publication of the identity of the complainant in sexual-
assault cases; and a judge issuing an injunction on his own motion, ex parte, prohibiting picketing of
the courthouse.
8. See supra note 4.
9. In the violation of s. 2(d) considered by the two dissenting justices in RWDSU v. Saskatchewan,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460, one (Dickson C.J.) would have saved the provision and the other (Wilson J.)
would have failed it. In Reference Re Public Service Employee RelationsAct (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R.
313 at 373-80, the same two dissenting justices would both have failed the provision on the Oakes
test on the basis that its objective was not pressingand substantial.
10. This violation was considered in United States ofAmerica v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469. At
issue was the extradition of a Canadian citizen to the United States where he would be charged with
narcotics offences.
11. This violation was considered in Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [198911 S.C.R. 591. At issue
was the prohibition of partnerships with lawyers who were not residents of the province.
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12. SeeR. v. Penno, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 865.
13. Two of these violations were found by majorities of the Court. One concerned the absence of
the defence of intoxication for a general intent offence. (The minority found no infringement. The
majority failed the violation under a non-Oakes s. 1 analysis.) The other concerned the police
recording of an accused's conversation with a friend. (The majority failed the violation under a
non-Oakes s. 1 analysis). The third violation was found by a minority. It concerned compulsory
education legislation. The minority would have failed the provision under s. 1, but not on the Oakes
test.
14. These violations dealt with a reverse-onus provision, the restriction of evidence of the
background of sexual assault complainants, and the prohibition of sexual activity with females under
fourteen years of age.
15. This violation concerned an order for a corporate officer to produce evidence and testify. See
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425.
16. In each of these four instances, a majority of the Court failed the violation under s. 1 without
getting to the Oakes test. These violations concerned: a police search of a backyard for narcotics,
police video surveillance, a border search by a customs officer, and a blood sample taken without a
warrant.
17. Two of these violations dealt with random traffic checks by police officers. (Both were saved by a
majority of the Court applying the Oakes test.) The third, which was not saved, concerned the
statutory power to detain persons found to be criminally insane.
18. This violation concerned a random traffic check by a police officer. It was saved by a majority of
the Court applying the Oakes test.
19. This violation concerned a border search by a customs officer.
20. These two violations concerned availability of the defence of intoxication for a general intent-
offence (R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63) and the Crown's peremptory jury challenges (in R. v.
Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91).
21. Two of these violations concerned the structure of a general court martial. The third concerned
the restriction of evidence pertaining to the complainant's background in sexual offence cases.
22. These two violations were considered in Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; and Miron v.
Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. In Egan v. Canada, four of the five justices found the infringement to
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be a violation on the Oakes test. However, Sopinka J.'s application of the Oakes test provided the
swing vote that saved the infringement.
23. The two infringements found by minorities here were the inclusion of alimony in the income of a
divorced woman, Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, and the criminal offence of having sex
with a female person under the age of fourteen in R v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906. In
Thibaudeau v. Canada, the minority would not have saved the provision. In Hess the minority would
have saved the infringing provision on the Oakes test (the majority found that no infringement had
occurred).
24. The two violations were found in Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration
Commission), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22; and McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229. The
majority did not save the age exclusions concerning unemployment insurance benefits in Tdtreault.
But it did save the restricted (from 18-65 years of age) prohibition of age discrimination in s. 19(2)
of the Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53.
25. See Mcainney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 230 (minority holding the university's
mandatory retirement policy to be an unjustifiable limitation of s. 15(1) right); Stoffinan v.
Vancouver General Hospital, [19901 3 S.C.R. 483 (minority finding hospital's mandatory retirement
policy to be an unjustifiable limitation of section 15(1) guarantee); Harrison v. University of British
Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451 (minority split on whether the university's mandatory retirement
policy was a justifiable limit).
26. See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, where the majority found
that citizenship as a requirement to be called to the bar was an unjustifiable limit on s. 15(1). In
Bennerv. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, the majority found that the treatment of
children born abroad to Canadian mothers before 1977, as compared to Canadian fathers, was an
unjustifiable violation of s. 15(1).
